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ABSTRACT 
International law promotes global peace and security by 
providing mechanisms for the pacific settlement of international 
disputes.  This Article examines these mechanisms and their place 
in the architecture of the international dispute resolution (“IDR”) 
system.  The Article identifies three core deficiencies of the IDR 
system that limit its effectiveness and capacity.  First, the 
international legal system has prioritized the development of 
adjudication over other forms of dispute resolution; the 
judicialization of international disputes and the proliferation of 
courts and tribunals evidence this.  However, adjudication is 
limited in its capacity to resolve disputes that involve non-state 
parties and extra-legal issues.  This is concerning because empirical 
studies show that international conflict is increasingly intra-state, 
and involves non-state actors and extra-legal issues.  Second, states 
prefer mediation to adjudication as a method for resolving 
disputes that occur in the context of inter-state conflict.  Yet the 
role and value of mediation have been underappreciated, and it 
lacks institutional support under international law.  Third, the 
current architecture of the IDR system promotes single method 
approaches, which can foster fragmented IDR approaches that 
separate legal issues from extra-legal ones, despite their 
interconnected nature.  It also fails to structurally incorporate 
emerging, hybrid IDR approaches that enhance IDR capacity.  In 
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response to these limitations, this Article argues that there is a need 
to restructure the IDR system to create a framework for 
understanding how to systematically integrate IDR methods across 
forums.  The Article concludes by considering several challenges 
that this approach presents to the state-centric foundations of the 
international legal system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For much of its history, international law has served to 
promote peace and security by providing for the pacific resolution 
of disputes between nations.1  Traditionally, this aim has been 
 
1 See generally U.N. Charter pmbl., para. 1 (noting peace and international 
security as a common goal of participating states); U.N. Charter art. 2 (“All 
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means . . . .”); U.N. 
Charter art. 33, para. 1 (mandating that parties to a dispute first seek a resolution 
through peaceful means). 
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served through the establishment of courts and tribunals set up for 
the purpose of settling legal disputes.  However, the evolving 
nature of conflict is changing the character of international dispute 
resolution.  Today’s conflicts are increasingly intra-state and 
involve non-state actors and extra-legal issues.  In response, 
dispute resolution methods and the institutions that provide them 
have evolved and multiplied.  Innovative dispute resolution 
mechanisms that extend beyond traditional legal forms into 
political and social dimensions have emerged.2  Despite the 
benefits of these approaches, they have been met with resistance by 
international law traditionalists who hold fundamentally different 
views about the purpose and role of dispute resolution under 
international law.3  Furthermore, while the growth and 
diversification of international dispute resolution has provided 
many benefits, it has also led to the lack of a coherent and effective 
system. 
This Article critiques the architecture of the existing IDR4 
system and argues that it should be restructured to provide a 
framework for integrating different dispute resolution methods 
and the institutions that provide them.  It also explores some 
important questions about the relationship between the 
international legal system and the system of international dispute 
resolution and how one both influences and is influenced by the 
other.  The central question, to borrow from James Crawford, is 
“can the superstructure change the foundations?”5  This Article 
examines how the foundations of international law impact the 
structure of the IDR system in ways that limit its efficacy and 
 
2 See generally JACOB BERCOVITCH & RICHARD JACKSON, CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES, METHODS, AND APPROACHES (2009) 
(discussing new methods for the resolution or management of international 
conflicts). 
3 See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, Policy Considerations and the International 
Judicial Process, reprinted in THEMES AND THEORIES: SELECTED ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND 
WRITINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 19–43 (2009) (discussing the tensions between 
different viewpoints over legal and political aspects of the international judicial 
process). 
4 For purposes of this Article, International Dispute Resolution is defined as 
methods used for assessing, preventing, managing, or resolving inter-state or 
other international disputes and conflicts.  This Article primarily considers the 
following forms of third-party IDR: adjudication (judicial settlement and 
arbitration), mediation and conciliation. 
5 JAMES CRAWFORD, International Law as an Open System, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 17, 18 (2002). 
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capacity.  The Article then extends this analysis to consider how 
international dispute resolution—through new approaches—is also 
affecting the foundations of international law. 
There are three central deficiencies with the current IDR 
system.  First, international law prioritizes the use of adjudication, 
which is limited in its capacity to provide effective dispute 
resolution.  Although the U.N. Charter provides for a variety of 
IDR methods,6 the international legal system has primarily 
advanced the institutionalization of regimes that support 
arbitration and judicial settlement.  The recent proliferation of 
courts and tribunals and the judicialization of dispute resolution, 
particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and commercial 
disputes, illustrate this development.7 
At once, the primacy of adjudication makes sense, given that 
state sovereignty is foundational to international law.  The basis for 
authority in adjudication reinforces this state-centric view.  For 
states, adjudication offers a dispute resolution process that 
promises familiarity, enjoys enforcement mechanisms, and clarifies 
rules for future behavior.8  However, the primacy of adjudication is 
misplaced because it is limited in its capacity to resolve disputes 
that involve non-state parties and extra-legal issues.  Judicial 
settlement before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), for 
 
6 See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (”The parties to any dispute, the 
continuance which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace 
and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”). 
7 See Philippe Sands, Introduction to RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, at ix, xi–xiii (2d ed. 2010) (describing the 
proliferation of international adjudicatory bodies as evidence of the growing trend 
toward third-party adjudication of international disputes); Cesare P. R. Romano, 
The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International 
Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 792–
95 (2007) (discussing the shift toward compelling disputants to consent to the 
jurisdiction of an international adjudicative body).  See generally Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution is 
Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119 (2006) (discussing the increase in 
the use of trials to resolve international legal disputes). 
8 See Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts, 
in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 155, 174 (I. 
William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997) (discussing the benefits and 
advantages of adjudication). 
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instance, is only available to states for contentious cases and to 
states and U.N. organs for advisory opinions.9 
This is a problem in light of empirical studies that show that 
the nature of conflict is changing.  During the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the main form of international conflict10 was inter-state.11  
At that time, it made sense to emphasize state-centric IDR practices 
because resolving disputes between nations minimized the need 
for them to send their militaries to war.12  However, since World 
War II (“WWII”), the number of inter-state armed conflicts has 
decreased, while the number of intra-state armed conflicts has 
increased.13  Non-state armed conflict, occurring between two or 
more non-state organized armed groups, has emerged as well.14  
Thus, the nature of international conflict in the 21st century 
increasingly involves non-state actors and complex extra-legal 
disputes.  These changes suggest that an effective IDR system 
requires the capacity to:  (1) provide for the full participation of 
non-state actors; and (2) address the full-spectrum of issues in a 
dispute. 
 
9 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055 (stating that “[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court”); 
id. art. 65, para. 1 (stating that the court may give an opinion to a legal question 
presented by any body authorized by Charter of the United Nations); see also How 
the Court Works, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court 
/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (discussing how the 
International Court of Justice entertains contentious cases and advisory 
proceedings). 
10 See discussion infra Part 2 (providing a detailed explanation of 
international conflict, but referring generally to inter-state armed conflicts and 
intra-state, non-state, or other forms of armed conflict that become 
internationalized by presenting a threat to global peace and security). 
11 See MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR 
1816–2007, at 562–65 (2010) (providing an empirical study of the onset of wars by 
type over time); see also ROBERT A. HINDE, BENDING THE RULES: MORALITY IN THE 
MODERN WORLD—FROM RELATIONSHIPS TO POLITICS AND WAR 199–224 (2007) 
(providing a historical account of inter-state wars from an ethics-based 
perspective). 
12 This Article acknowledges the definitional distinctions between these two 
terms and defines conflict as an ongoing multi-issue event that results in violence 
or the loss of life whereas a dispute is a nonviolent specific matter, by subject or 
time, or both.  However, there are cases that can be classified as both a dispute 
and a conflict where the terms are used interchangeably.  See BERCOVITCH & 
JACKSON, supra note 2, at 19–20 (providing a broad definition of the term 
“conflict”). 
13 See SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 11, at 562 (stating that intra-state wars 
began to rise by the mid-1960s). 
14 See id. at 70 (defining and describing non-state war). 
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Second, the international legal community has not given 
adequate attention to the role or value of non-judicial IDR 
methods.  Two empirical studies on international conflict 
management suggest that states prefer mediation to adjudication 
for resolving disputes that arise in the context of armed inter-state 
conflict.15  This might seem counterintuitive given the growth of 
adjudication capacity and use, but there are several explanations 
for this.  Mediation allows states to maintain control over the 
process and provides other benefits that adjudication does not.16  
However, the precise use and value of mediation in the 
international context is not well developed in international legal 
scholarship.  Furthermore, mediation lacks the necessary 
institutional capacity to adequately respond to the volume and 
array of international disputes. 
Third, the architecture of the IDR system is structured in a 
manner that promotes the use of single method approaches and 
fosters institutional fragmentation.  International dispute 
resolution is commonly described as a menu of single method 
approaches (negotiation, adjudication, mediation, conciliation, and 
inquiry), defined according to classifications (binding/nonbinding, 
and legal/diplomatic).17  This description presents IDR as a set of 
 
15 See JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT FROM 1945 TO 2003, at 29 fig.2 (2004) 
(surveying the choice of conflict management approaches for 343 international 
conflicts and finding that states used mediation in 59.3% of all cases, negotiation 
in 32.2%, and arbitration in 0.6%). 
16 See id. at 29 (arguing that mediation is frequently used because it has a high 
chance of success and permits states to retain some control over the process).  See 
also Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method in the Madness of 
Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 32 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 329, 331–33 (2006) (studying factors that impact the effectiveness of 
mediation in resolving international disputes); Derrick V. Frazier & William J. 
Dixon, Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000, 32 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 385, 395 tbl.3 (2006) (measuring the frequency of use of various 
mediation techniques in an attempt to assess their effectiveness in resolving 
international disputes). 
17 For examples of scholarly works that assess the application of adjudication, 
mediation, and other IDR methods as applied in international disputes, see 
generally JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES (1999) (providing a broad 
overview of the main processes of IDR); RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2d ed. 2010) (tracing the development of 
international courts and tribunals); J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (4th ed. 2005) (offering a comprehensive overview of international 
dispute resolution, including the relevant techniques and institutions involved). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/1
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fragmented processes that separate legal issues from extra-legal 
ones, despite their interconnected nature.  It also fails to recognize 
emerging hybrid approaches and their place in the system.  As case 
studies and a review of IDR institutions demonstrate, these hybrid 
approaches—defined as multiple (the use of two or more IDR 
methods applied sequentially) and mixed (integrating aspects of 
different methods into a single process)—offer important 
contributions that should be recognized.  For example, in the ICJ 
Frontier Dispute case, the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso 
reached a cease-fire and worked to resolve their underlying 
disputes through judicial settlement by the ICJ and a mediation-
like process that involved local stakeholders.18  This combination of 
rights-based and interest-based methods brought an end to the 
armed conflict and the ongoing disputes. 
In response to these limitations, this Article argues that there is 
a need to restructure the IDR system to create a framework for 
understanding how to systematically integrate IDR methods across 
forums.  Doing so provides an accurate descriptive account of the 
system’s capacity for dispute resolution.  It also enhances IDR by 
identifying how to integrate methods and institutions in a manner 
that promotes a coherent and effective system.  However, 
rethinking international dispute resolution as an integrated system 
challenges the state-centric foundations of the international legal 
system and raises questions about who the system seeks to serve. 
This Article proceeds in the following manner.  Part 2 provides 
definitional and historical context for international dispute 
resolution and its role in promoting global peace and security.  Part 
3 presents three areas of deficiency in the IDR system:  prioritizing 
adjudication, overlooking mediation, and structural fragmentation.  
Part 4 explores the use of hybrid approaches—multiple methods 
and mixed methods—in international dispute resolution, and 
examines their unique contributions to IDR capacity.  Part 5 
explains why it is important to restructure the architecture of the 
IDR system to promote the integration of methods and institutions.  
Part 6 considers how conceiving of international dispute resolution 
in this manner affects traditional notions concerning the purpose 
and scope of international law. 
 
18 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). 
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2. THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Promoting global peace and security has long been a 
fundamental purpose of international law.  The modern 
international community of states operationalized this purpose in 
the United Nations Charter in the wake of WWII.19  Article 33 of 
the U.N. Charter requires that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the 
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice.”20  Putting this principle 
into practice has required institutionalizing IDR by developing and 
promoting norms, creating methods, and establishing capacity 
through institutions.  These methods, along with their theories and 
practices, have evolved into a regime of “decision-making 
procedures”21 that, beyond preventing conflict, also provide the 
international community with a venue for solving collective 
problems.22  This Part provides a historical overview of the main 
methods of international dispute resolution in order to offer 
necessary definitions and context for the Article.23 
 
19 See U.N. Charter art. 33, paras. 1–2 (urging member nations to seek 
peaceful resolutions to international disputes); see also id. art. 2, para. 4 (calling for 
nations to refrain from the threat or use of force). 
20 Id. art. 33, para. 1. 
21 See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes 
as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185, 185 (1982) (offering a comprehensive 
discussion of international regimes and the influence that changes in structure, 
norms, and decision-making can have on them). 
22 See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) 
(providing substantive information regarding the complexities of negotiation and 
mediation). 
23 Note that the methods covered are referred to collectively as alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”) in the United States, Great Britain, and other 
countries.  This term refers to practices evolving out of the search for alternatives 
to litigation in municipal courts.  For more information regarding the origins of 
ADR in the United States, see generally LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the role of lawyers in 
preventing and resolving conflicts); Frank E. A. Sander, Professor of Law, 
Harvard Univ., Varieties of Dispute Processing (Apr. 8, 1976), in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. 
Wheeler eds., 1979) (advocating for the use of alternative methods in dispute 
resolution, such as arbitration and mediation). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/1
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IDR methods have traditionally been grouped by type 
(diplomatic, legal, political), aim (prevention, management, 
resolution), and enforcement status (binding or nonbinding).24  
Negotiation is often the first IDR method employed in a dispute. 
Defined as direct communication between disputing parties for the 
purpose of reaching agreements that will settle or resolve a 
dispute, the practice of negotiation is historically pervasive.25  
Negotiation is commonly categorized as a diplomatic form of IDR. 
The forms of IDR considered in this Article are third-party 
approaches.  Legal methods involve the settlement of a dispute 
through a decision based on a rule that is binding on the parties.26  
Adjudication is a legal method that is fundamentally a rights-based 
process administered through judicial settlement or arbitration that 
addresses claims composed of grievances over an injury coupled 
with an expectation of redress.27  Traditionally, state use of 
arbitration occurred through ad hoc bodies.28  At the Hague Peace 
Conference of 1899, 28 states adopted the Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in order to “insure the 
pacific settlement of international differences.”29  They 
institutionalized this principle with the establishment of The 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”).30  The Convention 
 
24 See COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 17, at 19–41 (discussing methods of 
settlement in international disputes). 
25 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 19–31 (discussing the basic 
principles and frameworks for international negotiation); MERRILLS, supra note 17, 
at 1–2 (discussing negotiation in international disputes). 
26 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 47–48 (discussing international 
arbitration and judicial settlement in binding third parties to a proposed 
resolution); MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 91 (discussing arbitration in international 
disputes). 
27 See Richard B. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International 
Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1982) (questioning how 
international disputes arise and the appropriateness of adjudication as a means of 
dispute resolution). 
28  See DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 1–4 (2007) (providing a 
historical account of the development of international arbitration); see also Sands, 
supra note 7, at x–xi (describing four phases of the development of international 
adjudication). 
29 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 1, July 
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779; see Sands, supra note 7, at ix (noting that the Convention 
“marked a turning point in favour of international adjudication before standing 
bodies”). 
30 See TERRIS ET AL., supra note 28, at 2–3 (describing the creation of the PCA 
and the structure of the PCA). 
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organized the PCA as a locus for international adjudication to 
ensure that these nations had alternatives to war.31  The PCA was 
empowered with the ability to conduct arbitration, conciliation and 
fact-finding.  After World War II, the importance of having a 
standing body with permanent judges led to a shift toward judicial 
settlement through the ICJ.32  Thus, international adjudication was 
institutionalized through the creation of two prominent forums 
offering distinct but related methods.  The purpose of creating 
these institutions was, in part, to enhance effective dispute 
settlement between nations in order to reduce the probability that 
they would resort to war as a means for settling differences.  Since 
then, international courts and tribunals have proliferated in 
number and variety.33  The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) 
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) are 
two recent examples.  Additional examples will be discussed in 
Part 3. 
Non-judicial forms of third-party IDR include mediation, 
conciliation, and fact-finding/inquiry.  Mediation is a form of 
third-party intervention by which an unbiased party convenes 
disputing parties, facilitates a process for communicating positions 
and underlying interests, and promotes agreement formation.34 
Mediation outcomes, absent other arrangements, are nonbinding. 
Mediation provides “direct positive contributions” such as agenda 
setting and problem solving and “weakens constraints on the 
primary parties.”35  One benefit of mediation in the international 
context is its inclusive and cross-cultural approach to problem 
 
31 See Sands, supra note 7, at ix (describing the formation of the PCA as the 
first standing body for international adjudication). 
32 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 4–5 (discussing the formation and 
organizational structure of the ICJ). 
33 See Sands, supra note 7, at ix (discussing a comprehensive treatment of 
international courts and tribunals); see also CESARE P.R. ROMANO & THE PROJECT ON 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC 
CHART, available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop 
_c4.pdf (providing a graphic and textual overview of the expansion of 
international courts, tribunals, and other judicial bodies). 
34 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 32–46 (defining and discussing 
mediation as a method of international dispute resolution); MERRILLS, supra note 
17, at 28–44 (discussing the use and structure of mediation in international 
disputes). 
35 MICHAEL BRECHER & JONATHAN WILKENFELD, A STUDY OF CRISIS 185 (2000).  
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SPAIN.DOC 11/23/2010  3:49 PM 
2010] RETHINKING INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 11 
solving.36  Mediation emerged as a field of scholarly study in the 
1980s, influenced by the rise of the practice of mediation as an 
alternative to litigation.37 
Conciliation operates by having an institutionalized third-
party, usually a commission, provide an impartial examination of 
the dispute and suggest settlement terms.38  The process is 
nonbinding.  The first documented adoption of conciliation in an 
inter-state context occurred in a 1920 treaty between Sweden and 
Chile and, since then, it has been included as a dispute resolution 
option in numerous treaties.39  Dispute resolution bodies have 
codified procedural rules, such as the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation, which uses the terms 
“mediation” and “conciliation” interchangeably.40  However, the 
use of conciliation is minimal, which is explained by its inherent 
restrictions, including limited subject matter and the expense of 
setting up a commission.41 
Fact-finding and inquiry are two processes often combined to 
develop an impartial account of the facts of a particular case in 
order to establish a foundation for negotiations, mediation, or 
another process.42  The practice of inquiry varies widely from true 
 
36 See NADJA ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MEDIATION: 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 48 (2009) (discussing how mediation is a flexible process with 
potential to accommodate a cross-cultural approach). 
37 See Louis Kriesberg, The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field, in 
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 51, 51–63 (I. 
William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997) (providing a comprehensive 
overview of the development of conflict resolution from 1914–1995). 
38 See MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 64 (discussing the method and history of the 
process of conciliation). 
39 See id. at 64–67 (noting the adoption of conciliation by the Belgian-Danish 
Commission, the East African Community, and the Chaco Commission, among 
others). 
40 See U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE L., MODEL LAW ON CONCILIATION WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND USE, at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.4 (2002) (noting the 
definitions of “conciliation” and “mediation” as interchangeable). 
41 See MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 87–88 (discussing the reasons for the 
infrequent use of conciliation, which including the restrictive nature of treaty 
obligations and the expense of convening and operating a commission); see also 
BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 15, at 25 (arguing that conciliation may be 
inappropriate for minor conflicts because it is too elaborate, but similarly may be 
insufficient for major conflicts because it is void of political authority). 
42 See MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 45–46 (noting the use of inquiry in resolving 
a disputed issue of fact). 
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fact-finding to activities that mirror arbitration.43  Other forms of 
third-party IDR include peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, 
and peacebuilding.44  Although these forms are outside the scope 
of this Article, they are important methods worthy of further study 
and analysis.45  Together, these methods, along with the variety of 
institutions and venues that provide them, make up the IDR 
system. 
In addition to creating rules and institutions, international law 
has proliferated norms that advance the use of dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  The ILC’s Report on State Responsibility promotes 
the use of dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing wrongful 
acts by one nation against another.46  In the transnational arena, 
parties have developed specialized dispute resolution services to 
help manage differences.47  In the treaty-making realm, nations 
proactively include provisions governing dispute settlement in 
agreements,48 which have been repeatedly noted in U.N. General 
 
43 See id. at 59–61 (discussing the valuable and varied methods of inquiry). 
44 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 76–168 (noting general 
strategies to peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and peacebuilding). 
45 See id. (discussing a comprehensive review of the definitions and use of 
these IDR methods). 
46 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd sess, Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 
2001, at 294, art. 42, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th sess., Supp. No. 10 (Dec. 12, 
2001), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf 
(discussing the benefits of a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism); see also 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 48th sess., May 6-July 26, 1996, at 64–65, arts. 54–60, 
U.N. Doc. A/51/10; GAOR 51st sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/A_51_10.pdf (governing the 
settlement of international disputes through negotiation, conciliation, and 
arbitration). 
47 See generally MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD 
(Naomi Norberg trans., 2009) (exploring ways to counter transnational pluralism 
and other problems associated with the increasing interconnectedness of national 
economies and institutions). 
48 See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 
14, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, amended by Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 19, 
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 
2005) (“In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a 
settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their 
own choice.”); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 187–88, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (setting forth the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter arts. 10–11, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 
120 (governing the development of “procedures for the assessment of liability and 
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Assembly Resolutions.49  IDR provisions in treaties have become so 
commonplace that some states have argued against their inclusion 
in treaties on the grounds that the international legal requirement 
is of such an obvious nature it does not require restatement.50 
3. DEFICIENCIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
SYSTEM 
This Part argues that the existing IDR system suffers from three 
critical limitations that affect its effectiveness and capacity.  First, 
the system emphasizes adjudication, which is not well suited to 
resolve disputes involving non-state actors or extra-legal issues.  
Second, it overlooks the value and institutional development of 
mediation, despite states’ preference for mediation in certain 
contexts.  Third, the architecture of the IDR system fails to offer a 
framework for understanding how to integrate methods and 
consequently fosters institutional fragmentation. 
3.1. The Primacy of Adjudication 
Adjudication is generally recognized as the central form of 
dispute resolution under international law.51  Its primary use has 
been to settle inter-state claims over areas of disputed territory, 
state responsibility, trade, investment, and more recently, the 
environment, human rights, and international crimes arising from 
armed conflict.  The focus on developing adjudication has emerged 
in two ways.  First, institutions that provide adjudication have 
 
the settlement of disputes regarding dumping”); see also Dominique Alheritiere, 
Settlement of Public International Disputes on Shared Resources: Elements of a 
Comparative Study of International Instruments, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701, 703–05 
(1985) (discussing various international conventions that include provisions 
governing the pacific settlement of disputes). 
49 See Alheritiere, supra note 48, at 704–05 (describing the General Assembly’s 
repeated decisions to “take note” of the United Nations Environment 
Programme’s draft principles on resource dispute settlement, which included a 
provision urging member nations to seek peaceful resolutions of disputes).  
50 See id. (noting several nation’s objections to the inclusion of a provision 
urging the pacific settlement of disputes in the United Nations Environmental 
Programme’s draft principles on resource dispute settlement, on the grounds that 
the repetition of such an “obvious and . . . accepted” premise of international law 
would only serve to weaken it).  
51 See generally Sands, supra note 7, at ix–xviii (discussing the emergence of 
adjudication as the primary form of IDR, the rise of international adjudicatory 
bodies, the increasing roles of non-state actors in international disputes, and the 
corresponding increase in international litigation).  
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proliferated in recent years.  In addition to the ICJ and PCA, 
standing forums presently include the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The World Trade Organization’s 
Dispute Settlement Body (“WTO DSB”), and the International 
Criminal Court.  Additionally, the creation of treaty-based forums 
has become more pervasive.52  Second, scholars claim that there is a 
trend toward compulsory jurisdiction and binding decision-
making in international adjudicatory forums.53  The normalization 
of adjudication suggests that “disputes are more likely than ever to 
be resolved through a trial or adjudicatory method.”54 
States use adjudication because it offers certainty of process 
and a binding outcome that enjoys the promise of compliance 
under international law.55  International courts assist states in 
developing a common understanding of facts and law that 
promotes dispute resolution by clarifying substantive rules of 
law.56  Adjudication also extends the state-centric foundations of 
international law by treating states as the primary actors with 
authority to allow for the participation of non-state actors. 
However, from the perspective of enhancing capacity to 
resolve international disputes, there is a compelling argument 
against solely emphasizing adjudication above other forms of IDR.  
 
52 See id. at xiii (noting the trend toward inclusion of binding dispute 
resolution methods in treaties, e.g. the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and the 1994 World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding). 
53 See Romano, supra note 7, at 803–16 (discussing the shift in international 
adjudication from consensual jurisdiction and the option clause to the rise of 
compulsory jurisdiction). 
54 Andrea K. Schneider, Bargaining in the Shadow of (International) Law: What 
the Normalization of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes Means for 
Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 789, 793 (2009).  See also Susan D. 
Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 161, 201 (2007) (“The prevalence of arbitration provisions and the apparent 
structural inclination towards arbitration indicate a presumption that arbitration 
is the ‘best’ mechanism for resolving treaty disputes.”) (footnote omitted); 
Christopher Shen, International Arbitration and Enforcement in China: Historical 
Perspectives and Current Trends, 14 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 69, 70 (2005) 
(characterizing arbitration as the “preferred method of international dispute 
resolution”). 
55 See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 
1979) (discussing the complex relationship between nations and international law 
and finding that most states obey most international law most of the time). 
56 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY 51–53 (2008) (discussing the role that international courts play as 
an “information mechanism”). 
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The nature of international disputes is changing in ways that 
require approaches to dispute resolution not offered by 
adjudication.  Empirical studies on the onset of wars over time 
indicate that inter-state armed conflict is declining, while intra-
state cases are increasing.  The first study was conducted by the 
Correlates of War (“COW”) Project, founded by J. David Singer in 
1936.  This study categorized armed conflicts resulting in at least 
1000 deaths57 and defined them as either inter-state, extra-state, 
civil, or—more recently—intra-state and non-state conflicts.58  The 
2010 COW study identified 655 wars between 1816 and 2007, and 
found a general constancy in the incidence of war onsets overall.59  
However, the data suggests that intra-state wars are a growing 
percentage of the whole since WWII.  Regionally, Asia, Africa, and 
the Western Hemisphere are the most war-prone regions, followed 
by the Middle East, Europe, and Oceania.60  An earlier 2003 COW 
study of 401 wars between 1816 and 1997 found a “negative 
correlation between extra-state and intra-state war onsets.”61  The 
University of Maryland’s Peace and Conflict 2010 report by Hewitt, 
Wilkenfeld, and Gurr found a similar trend, and noted that intra-
state conflict is rising.62  A third study of 121 conflicts between 1989 
 
57 SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 11, at 6. 
58 See id. (defining inter-state conflicts as armed conflicts between “States or 
members of the interstate system”; extra-state conflicts as armed conflicts between 
a state and a non-state entity outside of the state’s borders; and civil conflicts as 
conflicts between the government of a state and other groups within that state’s 
borders); id. at 337 (“[I]ntra-state war involves sustain combat between or among 
organized armed forces that takes place within the territorial boundaries of a state 
system member . . . .”); id. at 485 (defining non-state wars, which consists of two 
distinct classifications: “wars between . . . nonstate entities that take place in 
nonstate territory . . . and wars between [nonstate armed groups] that take place 
across state borders”).  The definition of “intra-state” conflict has evolved, and 
now refers to conflicts taking place within a state’s territory, including—but not 
limited to—civil wars and, most recently, conflicts between or among non-state 
entities. 
59 Id. at 562. 
60 Id. at 566 fig.7.6. 
61 Id. at 562. 
62 See J. Joseph Hewitt, Trends in Global Conflict, 1946–2007, in PEACE AND 
CONFLICT 2010 27, 27 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2010) (graphically demonstrating 
the negative correlation between extra-state and intra-state war onsets and noting 
that “[a]t the beginning of 2008 . . . [all armed conflicts worldwide] were civil 
conflicts between the government of a state, on the one hand, and at least one 
internal group on the other”). 
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and 2005 identified 90 as intra-state and seven as inter-state.63  In 
2005, all 31 ongoing conflicts were intra-state, with six of them 
internationalized (indicating the presence of a second state’s armed 
forces).64  As of early 2008, there were 26 active armed conflicts in 
the world and all were classified as intra-state, occurring between a 
government and one or more internal groups.65 
These studies suggest that intra-state conflicts are on the rise 
while onsets of inter-state conflict are declining.  This is significant 
because adjudication is primarily designed to serve state actors.  
Most adjudicatory forums lack jurisdiction over non-state actors 
that are important stakeholders in such disputes.66  Stakeholders 
that lack standing or that fall outside of the forum’s jurisdiction can 
be excluded from the process.67  Non-state actors have no recourse 
to bring a claim before the ICJ in contentious cases and only U.N. 
organs and agencies may seek recourse from the ICJ in the form of 
advisory opinions.  While the PCA permits cases involving state-
controlled entities or international organizations, the second party 
must be a state.68  Adjudicatory bodies that derive jurisdiction 
through treaties are typically limited to states that have become 
subject to the treaty.  Without the capacity to increase non-state 
actor participation in adjudicatory proceedings, this form of IDR is 
not well equipped to resolve disputes that arise in the context of 
intra-state conflict and, given the data, this is an emerging 
problem. 
A second limitation is that adjudication is not designed to 
address extra-legal issues.  Its limited justiciability makes 
adjudication poorly equipped to resolve complex, multi-issue 
disputes involving political, social, environmental, and ethical 
 
63 Lotta Harbom et al., Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements, 43 J. PEACE RES. 
617, 618 tbl.2 (2006). 
64 Id. 
65 Hewitt, supra note 62, at 27. 
66 See Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law, 
52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12 (2003) (describing both the increasing importance of 
non-state entities in today’s global arena and the lack of legal jurisdiction over 
these entities). 
67 See, e.g., PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 
252–53 (3d ed. 2009) (showing that judicial proceedings and arbitration tend not to 
cater to the multilateral nature of certain environmental issues). 
68 See Rules of Procedure, PERM. COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1188 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Optional Rules for Arbitration). 
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interests.69  Often a court will issue an opinion that fails to resolve 
key issues in the case.  For example, despite the ICJ’s decision 
regarding Slovakia and Hungary’s dispute over a project to build 
barrages in the Danube River,70 the matter remains unresolved.71  
In the Nuclear Tests cases, and other cases,72 the ICJ was heavily 
criticized for leaving the question of legality of nuclear testing, a 
politicized matter, undecided, and for failing to identify legal 
principles upon which environmental protection could be based.73  
 
69 See R. P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1969) 
(discussing the challenges and limitations of adjudication in various international 
contexts, including the fact that the ICJ is “hedged in by the sacrosanct limits of 
consent and curbed by the absence of any execution machinery”); Richard B. 
Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement 
Technique, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1982) (explaining the potential inability of a legal 
judgment to address the underlying primary, often unrelated, issues which 
prompted the legal matter); J. G. Merrills, The Role and Limits of International 
Adjudication, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 169, 169-82 
(William E. Butler ed., 1987) (exploring the justiciability of international disputes 
and specifically, the question “why adjudication as a process is capable of dealing 
with some disputes and not with others”); G. Shinkaretskaya, The Present and 
Future Role of International Adjudication as a Means for Peacefully Settling Disputes, 29 
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 87, 88 (1989) (suggesting that an international court cannot play a 
role in avoiding armed conflict because the court has “no powers to act 
independently and possess[es] very limited opportunities for influencing the 
political conduct of States Parties to a dispute”). 
70 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
71 See Salman M.A. Salman, Good Offices and Mediation and International Water 
Disputes, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 155, 162–64 (The Int’l 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2002) (pointing out that, despite 
adjudication, the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros dispute and many other water disputes 
remain unresolved). 
72 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8) (deciding “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional 
international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons” but not reaching the issue of nuclear testing); Certain Phosphate Lands 
in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240 
(June 26) (avoiding ruling upon the substantive legal issues before the court); 
Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20) (declining to 
rule upon the illegality of atmospheric nuclear weapon testing); see also Press 
Release, Int’l Court of Justice, New Zealand’s Request for an Examination of the 
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s 1974 Judgment in the 
Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) I.C.J. Press Release 95/29 (Sept. 22, 
1995) (denying New Zealand’s request for special procedure filed subsequent to 
the Nuclear Tests Case decision). 
73 See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20) 
(declining to rule upon the illegality of atmospheric nuclear weapon testing); 
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Interim Protection Order, 1973 I.C.J. 135 (June 22) 
(encouraging France to avoid nuclear testing barring resolution of the dispute); see 
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Dispute resolution mechanisms under treaties are generally limited 
to the subject matter governed by the applicable treaty, thus 
making complex substantive cases, such as the Shrimp-Turtle cases, 
difficult to resolve.74  One critique of the increased judicialization 
of the WTO argues that the contentious nature of adjudication can 
lead to heightened hostility between nations as compared to 
negotiation or conciliation, and may undermine negotiation by 
making it more difficult to resume talks if a party refuses to accept 
a final judicial decision.75 
Other limitations also affect adjudication.  Adjudication is slow 
and costly.  Court judgments may take years, during which time 
the nature of the dispute will have undoubtedly changed.  This 
makes implementing judgments challenging.76  Many countries 
and non-state actors view courts as a place for Westernized justice 
and concerns about the lack of diversity of judges and court bias 
persist.77  Finally, there are capacity limitations.  The ICJ, for 
example, lacks the capacity to consider all potential disputes over 
which it could assume jurisdiction.  From 1946 to 1996, the ICJ 
assumed jurisdiction over 75 contentious cases and issued 39 
judgments on the merits and 22 advisory cases and opinions.78  
 
also Laura Horn, The Role of Mediation in International Environmental Law, 4 AUSTL. 
DISP. RESOL. J. 16 (1993). 
74 The Shrimp-Turtle cases involved a dispute over a trade measure 
implemented by the United States to prohibit the import of shrimp from countries 
that were not using turtle excluder devices, which was challenged as inconsistent 
with GATT.  See TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 326–31 (2009) (explaining the basis for the WTO Appellate Body’s 
decisions in the Shrimp-Turtles cases).  See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional 
Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . . ”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 89–90 (2002) (discussing 
the difficulties arising from the “horizontal allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction” 
in situations where it is unclear which international organization has jurisdiction 
over a specific matter). 
75 See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order 
for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 349, 396–97 (1994) (examining critical 
arguments that “a propensity . . . to accentuate adjudication may bring about the 
opposite of its intended effect”). 
76 See GARY C. BRYNER, FROM PROMISES TO PERFORMANCE: ACHIEVING GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS 96–97 (1997) (describing challenges surrounding the 
implementation of a decision in the context of a perpetually changing 
environment). 
77 See MICHELLE L. BURGIS, BOUNDARIES OF DISCOURSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE: MAPPING ARGUMENTS IN ARAB TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 19–37 (2009) 
(characterizing the PCIJ’s jurisprudence treated “Third World states as objects, and 
not subjects, of international law”) (emphasis in original). 
78 Introduction, 51 INT'L CT. JUST. Y.B. 1, 3–7 (1996-1997). 
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Since 1996, the number of cases submitted to the ICJ has grown in 
size, scope and complexity.  As of August 1, 2010, there were 
fifteen contentious cases and one advisory case pending before the 
ICJ.79  These critiques of adjudication highlight its central 
limitations and challenge its placement as the prominent IDR 
method. 
3.2. Overlooking Mediation 
A second critique of the international dispute resolution system 
is related to the first.  Just as adjudication has been the focus of 
IDR, mediation has been undervalued and overlooked.80  There is a 
lack of institutional capacity at the international level for 
mediation.  There is no standing body equivalent to the ICJ to 
provide mediation services to states for international disputes.  
Although the PCA and the ICSID provide conciliation, they do not 
offer mediation.  The use of mediation for international disputes, in 
both the legal and armed conflict contexts, remains ad hoc.81  
Mediation lacks formal enforcement mechanisms under 
international law, so compliance is voluntary or coerced through 
political pressure and other means.  Without proper recognition in 
the architecture of the IDR system, mediation lacks the power and 
institutional support associated with adjudicatory forums that 
have a place in the international legal regime.82  Furthermore, there 
are no universally accepted procedural rules governing the use and 
practice of mediation.  Private mediation providers such as the 
American Arbitration Association and the International Mediation 
Institute have developed protocols for certifying mediators in the 
 
79 See Pending Cases, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket 
/index.php?p1=3&p2=1 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
80 See CESARE P. R. ROMANO, THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 46–64 (2000) (detailing 
treatment of the use of negotiation, consultation, good offices, mediation, inquiry, 
and conciliation in international environmental disputes). 
81 Christine Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution Under International Law, in 
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 123, 124–25 
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998) (stating that mediation and other forms of dispute 
resolution were used for the most part on an ad hoc basis, resulting in under-
utilization during the Cold War). 
82 See generally Edward N. Luttwak, Give War A Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 36 
(1999) (arguing that dispute settlement prevents lasting peace by interrupting 
wars between minor powers, which should be allowed to run their course). 
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practice of international mediation.83  But, to date, there is no 
venue for determining standards or qualifying international 
mediators that is generally accepted by the international 
community or recognized under international law. 
This is important because states prefer mediation to 
adjudication for resolving disputes that arise in the context of inter-
state armed conflicts.  Two empirical studies support this claim.  
The first study conducted by Bercovitch and Fretter surveyed the 
use of dispute resolution methods in 343 international conflicts 
occurring between 1945 and 2003, and found that states’ preference 
for mediation was the highest, followed by negotiation, with 
arbitration coming in last.84  A second empirical study supports 
these findings, showing that mediation, categorized as a 
diplomatic method, is the most prevalent form of third-party 
conflict management.  The other methods, by category, include 
verbal expressions (negotiations, demands), diplomacy 
(inquiry/fact-finding, good offices, conciliation), legal processes 
(arbitration, judicial settlement, war crimes tribunal), civil 
administration (humanitarian assistance), and military 
involvement (demobilizations, peacekeeping).85  Judicial settlement 
at the ICJ remains the method of last resort for state actors.86  
Therefore, there is tension between the IDR method states prefer in 
this context and the capacity presently provided for by the IDR 
system. 
 
83 See, e.g., How to become IMI Certified, INT’L MEDIATION INST., 
http://www.imimediation.org/how-to-become-imi-certified (last visited Oct. 25, 
2010) (providing general information on International Mediation Institute 
certification). 
84 See BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 15, at 29 fig. 2 (illustrating that in a 
study of 343 registered conflicts, 59.3% used mediation while only 0.6% resorted 
to arbitration). 
85 See Frazier & Dixon, supra note 16, at 394–96 (using a dataset documenting 
conflict management of militarized inter-state disputes occurring from 1946 to 
2000); id. at 400 (noting that mediation is an effective technique to produce 
settlements but arguing that military intermediary actions, such as peacekeeping, 
are more useful). 
86 See BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 15, at 27–28 (suggesting that the 
costly, slow, and retroactive nature of judicial settlement is often unsatisfactory in 
cases where harms with irreversible effects were not prevented); see also BURGIS, 
supra note 77 (discussing the historical reluctance of developing countries to use 
the ICJ due to concerns about bias and lack of diversity); ROMANO, supra note 80, 
at 92 (stating that it is “an indisputable fact that . . . litigation in international law 
is a matter of last resort”). 
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The following critiques of international mediation have 
contributed to perceptions about its lack of value.  First, while the 
United Nations is the most recognized provider of mediation for 
international conflict, there are criticisms about the United Nation’s 
effectiveness in this role.  Historically, the U.N. Secretary-General 
has offered good offices to states on the brink of, or engaged in, 
war.  In addition, the U.N. Department of Political Affairs houses 
the U.N. Mediation Support Unit, a center that provides 
educational and operational support for mediation.87  In 2008, a 
five-person Mediation Support Standby Team was developed to 
allow for the deployment of mediators to conflict areas on short 
notice to lend expertise in areas including power sharing, 
constitution formation, security, human rights and justice.88  Yet, 
arguably, this is not the best institution to provide mediation.  The 
U.N. lacks the human and financial capacity to meet demands for 
mediation services in international conflicts.89  States often seek 
assistance from the U.N. for the most difficult cases and at the 
stage when the conflict is least capable of being resolved.90  Notable 
mediation failures include the efforts of U.N. missions to prevent 
new conflicts in Darfur (2007), Afghanistan (2006) and Georgia 
(1994).91  An empirical study of 295 conflicts between 1945 and 
 
87 See Peacemaking, U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 
www.un.org/depts/dpa/peace.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (discussing the 
role of U.N. peacekeeping and the various entities that support peacekeeping 
functions); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Pub. Info., United Nations Announces 
New ‘On-Call’ Mediation Team to Advise Peace Envoys in Field, U.N. Press 
Release PA/1 (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs 
/2008/pa1.doc.htm (announcing the formation of a new Standby Team of 
Mediation Experts in an effort to build up capacity for preventive diplomacy). 
88 See UN: Norway Supported “On Call” Mediation Team is a Valuable Resource, 
NORWAY: MISSION TO THE UN, www.norway-un.org/News/News-
2009/110609_MSU (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (noting that the team is 
administered by the Norwegian Refugee Council on behalf of the MSU); id. 
(noting that team members serve one-year terms and were first deployed to 
Kenya in March 2008 during the post-election conflict). 
89 See Peacemaking, supra note 87 (outlining steps that are being taken in an 
effort to increase the U.N.’s capacity to handle international disputes); see also 
Press Release, supra note 87 (considering a $21 million proposal to sustain and 
enhance U.N. peacemaking activities). 
90 See Saadia Touval, Why the UN Fails, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 44, 46–48 (1994) 
(characterizing the U.N. as a “last-ditch, last resort affair” and noting that it is not 
surprising that the organization is often blamed for its failure to solve problems). 
91 See Greg Mills & Terence McNamee, Mission Improbable: International 
Interventions, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Conflict Resolution, in 
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1995 showed that mediation by the U.N. resulted in a 35.7% 
success rate.  Both regional organizations and mediation provided 
by a mix of institutions had higher success rates (44.8% and 40% 
respectively).92  This suggests that efforts to develop mediation 
capacity at the international level must consider the appropriate 
institutional level and perhaps reconsider the role of the U.N.. 
Beyond skepticism about the role of the U.N., there are 
concerns about the dangers of mediation in general that are not 
well developed and lead to concerns about its efficacy.  One 
critique is that in encouraging parties to be forward-looking, the 
mediation process does not treat the need to establish facts and 
determine attribution for past harms.93  Without adequate 
safeguards, mediation may fail to deal with important power 
imbalances and intensify a conflict.  The mediation effort in 
Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide is one costly example of this.94  
Mediation can empower spoilers in cases where one or more 
parties are not participating in good faith.  In prioritizing the 
interests of the parties present, there is a concern that mediation 
agreements that violate interests of public importance may be 
permitted and may inhibit long-term peace.  For example, when 
parties in mediation prioritize short-term security goals95 or the 
mediator pursues a cease-fire agreement, these priorities often 
detract from, or ignore altogether, underlying causes of the 
dispute.96  It may be the case that mediation is not effective in 
certain contexts.  Failure rates linked to geographic indicators 
 
CONUNDRUM 57, 57–64 (Brett D. Schaefer ed., 2009) (discussing the failure of 
conflict resolution in Afghanistan, Georgia, and Sudan). 
92 BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 67 tbl.2. 
93 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and 
Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 7 (2004) (identifying the different components necessary for 
successful dispute resolution). 
94 See Melanie Greenberg, Mediating Massacres: When “Neutral, Low-Power” 
Models of Mediation Cannot and Should Not Work, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 185, 
200–05 (2003) (explaining the failure of mediation prior to the ethnic cleansing that 
occurred in Rwanda in 1994). 
95 See JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND 
TRANSFORMING WATER CONFLICTS 33–49 (2009) (discussing alternative dispute 
resolution in the context of water resources disputes).  
96 See E. Franklin Dukes, What We Know About Environmental Conflict 
Resolution: An Analysis Based on Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 191, 192–93 (2004) 
(analyzing and comparing the characteristics of environmental conflict resolution 
with other procedures). 
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illustrate that efforts to mediate regional conflicts in Latin America 
have generally not been successful.97 
Finally, the ad hoc and confidential nature of mediation makes 
documenting its use and lessons learned difficult.  The absence of 
empirical information about international mediation discredits its 
validity as a field of scholarly study.  Until recently, most sources 
on the subject came from narrative accounts of individual success 
stories.98  This provides context-specific data but not information 
about the use of the method as a whole.  Because mediation is 
confidential, detailed information about what happened during the 
process, why parties made certain decisions, etc., is generally not 
publicly available.  Accounts remain largely firsthand, as an 
individual who was present writes about the case, typically long 
after the mediation concluded.  Without an institution to keep 
track of lessons learned, there is limited evidence for establishing 
what works, when it works, and why it works.  The lack of data 
contributes to an underdeveloped body of work on mediation in 
international legal scholarship as well.  Yet, mediation’s secrecy 
makes it attractive to states because confidentiality can limit 
political risks associated with resolving disputes.99 
Given these critiques, understanding how mediation is used 
and the criteria that contribute to its success may help to elevate its 
value as a form of IDR.  Mediation is commonly understood to be a 
form of third-party dispute resolution that is voluntary, 
confidential, non-binding, ad hoc, and informal in nature.  The 
practice of mediation in the international context is varied.100  For 
example, scholars define mediation as non-coercive and 
facilitative, but in practice coercive and directive mediation styles 
 
97 See Carolyn M. Shaw, Conflict Management in Latin America, in REGIONAL 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 123, 149 (Paul F. Diehl & Joseph Lepgold eds., 2003) 
(“[T]he guerrilla insurgencies and drug war in Colombia and Peru . . . are far from 
ideal for achieving a diplomatic settlement.”).  
98 See Jacob Bercovitch, Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context, in STUDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 3, 22 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002) (stating that until 
recent decades, scholarly research into human conflict and their manner of 
resolution was rare and marginal). 
99 See G. Shinkaretskaya, supra note 69, at 90 (discussing the advantages of 
non-judicial methods including their ability to allow the parties to find political 
compromises). 
100 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Advisory System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 36–38 (1996) (discussing 
how mediation falls between formal litigation and informal discussions on the 
spectrum of dispute resolution methods). 
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are employed.101  Mediation can be used proactively and is 
procedurally open to a variety of stakeholders.  Mediators use 
process-based skills to elicit interests, identify zones of agreement 
and facilitate resolution.  The mediation process engages parties in 
setting an agenda and addressing timing issues.102  Mediation 
helps adjust disputants’ expectations by promoting conformity103 
and problem-solving behavior that, in turn, enhance the formation 
of legitimate outcomes by exerting normative restraints when 
participants adopt shared expectations.104  It can also abate 
constraints, which prevent parties from reaching resolution by 
lowering political costs through face-saving and promoting flexible 
bargaining.105  Mediation can prevent escalation while addressing 
the entire range of issues involved in the dispute.106  Because 
mediation is nonbinding, it provides states with problem-solving 
opportunities that do not infringe on sovereignty. 
Scholars have developed criteria for measuring the 
effectiveness of international mediation.  Mediation success is 
influenced by the nature and timing of the dispute, the skill and 
status of the mediator, strategy, and conflict history.107  Parties may 
need to recognize that they have a low probability of getting what 
 
101 See William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation in the Post-
Cold War Era, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS 445, 445–61 (Chester A. Crocker et al. 
eds., 1996) (analyzing various participants’ motives in meditation during 
international conflicts). 
102 See BRECHER & WILKENFELD, supra note 35, at 185–86 (2000) (discussing the 
effects of third-party intervention in an international crisis). 
103 See Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, in ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 115, 117–19 (Michael Freeman ed., 1995) (proposing that one 
of mediation’s objectives is to have disputants conform to and accept social 
norms). 
104 See generally JOAQUIN TACSAN, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1992) (studying the effectiveness of international law in 
conflict resolution through the International Legal Dynamics framework and the 
expectations participants derive through legal reasoning). 
105 See id. (analyzing the benefits political disputants can receive by engaging 
in mediation during an international conflict). 
106 See Charles Kegley & Gregory Raymond, Third Party Mediation and 
International Norms: A Test of Two Models, 9 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 33, 37 
(1985) (“[M]ediation . . . deals with the entire political context of a dispute rather 
than with narrow legal technicalities.”). 
107 See SAM KAGEL & KATHY KELLY, THE ANATOMY OF MEDIATION: WHAT 
MAKES IT WORK 114–15 (1989) (discussing preference for different meeting styles 
at different phases of mediation); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation—A Preferred 
Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S5, S16 (1989) (discussing the various 
steps and factors involved in mediation). 
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they want through unilateral action before they engage third-party 
assistance.108  Furthermore, mediation style affects outcome. 
Directive strategies are more effective for high intensity conflict; 
“[P]rocedural strategies and regional mediators are effective in 
resolving low intensity conflicts . . . . ”109  International mediators 
who have resources, prestige, and physical distance from the 
dispute are the most effective for high intensity, while regional 
mediators or those with local contextual understanding are most 
effective for low intensity disputes.110  Thus, it is important to 
assess the intensity level of situation.  A mediator’s power also 
affects outcome.  Mediators exert power through coercion, 
persuasion, and acculturation.  Sources of mediator power include 
reputation (i.e., credibility and prior track-record), the backing of a 
powerful entity such as a nation or the U.N., and the ability to 
access resources.  The perceived lack of power in mediation is that 
mediators cannot force agreements or enforce outcomes, although 
this makes assumptions about authoritarian approaches to 
resolving conflict.111 
Mediation has been used successfully in a variety of 
international conflicts and disputes.  For example, in the Amur 
River Dispute between China and Russia, the underlying issue was 
an unclear boundary demarcation along a portion of the Amur 
River and several islands.112  Russia claimed that ownership rights 
were granted under the 1858 Treaty of Adigun and the 1860 Peking 
Treaty.  Although seemingly a legal matter, the parties resolved the 
dispute through a joint field-mapping exercise of the disputed area 
where they agreed to divide the islands in half.  The process, which 
involved mediation, worked so well that they followed a similar 
arrangement in the Argun River Dispute.113  Other notable 
 
108 See Lawrence Susskind & Eileen Babbitt, Overcoming Obstacles to Effective 
Mediation of International Disputes, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 30, 
48 (Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1992) (offering five criteria for 
effective international mediation). 
109 Jacob Bercovitch & Scott S. Gartner, Is There Method in the Madness of 
Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 32 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 329, 329 (2006). 
110 See id. at 351. (explaining the qualities of the best mediators for different 
types of conflicts). 
111 See Fuller, supra note 103, at 315 (discussing the role of authority in 
mediation). 
112 See RONGXING GUO, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: A 
GLOBAL HANDBOOK, 45–47 (2007) (describing the dispute over the Amur River). 
113 See id. at 50-51 (detailing the dispute surrounding the Argun River). 
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examples of mediation success in the international context include 
a series of IDR efforts, including mediation by the World Bank that 
took place between India and Pakistan resulting in the 1960 Indus 
Waters Treaty that addressed conflict over water rights pertaining 
to the Indus River.114  Another example is the Vatican’s mediation 
of the 1981 Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, 
which took place after direct negotiations, a referral to the ICJ and 
arbitration by a British panel failed.115  Also noteworthy were 
George Mitchell’s efforts in bringing an end to active armed 
conflict in Northern Ireland.116 
The context in which mediation is offered and accepted is 
important.  One study that analyzed empirical data on the 
variations in the offer and acceptance of mediation in intra-state vs. 
inter-state militarized conflict occurring between 1946 and 1999 
suggests that there are important mediation differences between 
inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts.  States are more likely to 
accept mediation (by state mediators) in an intra-state context than 
an inter-state context.117  Mediation (by states) is more likely to be 
 
114 See S. M. A. Salman, Good Offices and Mediation and International Water 
Disputes, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 155, 183–92 (The Int’l 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003) (presenting a case study 
of the World Bank’s mediation efforts and attributing its success to: continued 
involvement at the highest level, flexibility, successful use of pressure and 
concessions, ability to secure adequate funding, and active engagement in 
implementation). 
115 See THOMAS PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 135–85 
(1992) (offering a detailed account of the Vatican’s six-year mediation efforts and 
noting that Argentina’s transition in 1983 to a democratic government may have 
been paramount to the outcome); James L. Garrett, The Beagle Channel Dispute: 
Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone, J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & 
WORLD AFF. 81, 81 (1985) (discussing the history and importance of the Beagle 
Channel dispute); M. C. Mirow, International Law and Religion in Latin America: The 
Beagle Channel Dispute, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 15–27 (2004) (discussing 
the role played by the Vatican as a religious institution). 
116 See generally GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (1999) (discussing the 
history of Northern Ireland’s end to armed conflict); Daniel Curran & James K. 
Sebenius, The Mediator as Coalition Builder: George Mitchell in Northern Ireland, 8 
INT’L NEGOTIATION 111, 111 (2003) (analyzing George Mitchell’s approach to 
mediation in Northern Ireland as a way of understanding mediation more 
generally).  
117 See Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting 
Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 261 (2009) 
(noting that acceptance rate for mediation is 86% for civil wars and 66% for inter-
state conflicts, however mediation is also more likely to be offered in civil wars). 
Table 1 describes that 14% of militarized intra-state conflicts received an offer of 
mediation compared to 1% of militarized inter-state conflicts.  Id. at 260–61.  The 
acceptance rate of mediation for intra-state conflicts was 86% compared to 66% for 
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offered in intra-state conflicts than inter-state conflicts.  Duration of 
the conflict increases the likelihood of mediation acceptance in 
intra-state cases, but not inter-state ones.118  State mediators with a 
history of conflict management are more likely to offer 
mediation.119  State offers to mediate intra-state conflicts are 
dependent upon expectations of acceptance, thereby indicating the 
presence of selection bias.120  Mediation is more likely to occur in 
international military rivalries.121  International disputes 
characterized as highly complex, intense and of long duration; and 
in cases in which the parties have not been willing to reach an 
agreement.122 
In conclusion, the value of mediation as a means for resolving 
international disputes in all contexts is worthy of further study.  
Beyond scholarship, it is important to build additional capacity at 
the international institutional level for mediation and develop a 
more complex understanding about how it contributes to the 
overall value of the IDR system. 
3.3. Structural Fragmentation 
The third critique is that the architecture of the IDR system is 
designed around a framework that understands IDR as a collection 
of single method approaches.  This is descriptively inaccurate 
because it fails to account for the full spectrum of IDR practices 
that extends beyond single approach methods, which are 
 
inter-state conflict.  Id.  Factors that increase the acceptance rate of an offer to 
mediate include historical or colonial ties; alliances and trade interests; history of 
conflict management on the behalf of the state mediator; and duration of the 
conflict for intra-state wars.  Id. at 262–64. 
118 See id. at 263–64 (noting that in civil wars duration increases likelihood of 
successful mediation, but duration is ineffective in inter-state conflicts). 
119 See id. at 263 (recognizing that mediators with previous experience in 
conflict mediation are more successful). 
120 See id. at 256 (discussing a study of third-party intervention by states into 
militarized inter-state disputes and civil conflict data sets between 1946-1999.  
This study did not include data about international organizations providing third-
party intervention).  
121 See Jacob Bercovitch & Paul F. Diehl, Conflict Management of Enduring 
Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing and Short-Term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 299, 299 (1997) (exploring “how often mediation actually occur in 
the context of enduring rivalries and . . . at what phase(s) mediation efforts are 
undertaken”).  
122 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 32–46 (discussing typical 
characteristics of mediation and international conflict resolution). 
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examined in Part 4.  This Part focuses on a second critique.  By 
promoting single method approaches, the structure of the IDR 
system fosters fragmentation between methods and the institutions 
that provide them. 
Scholars have traditionally categorized the IDR system as a 
menu of single method approaches that range from negotiation to 
non-binding, third-party intervention to legal approaches.123  
Defining the system in this manner presents methods in ways that 
divide and separate.124  Process selection is based on dichotomies 
such as binding or nonbinding; legal or diplomatic; settlement or 
resolution.  Legal disputes are often tracked to adjudication, while 
disputes considered to be high-intensity and political in nature are 
tracked to diplomatic methods.  But this is antithetical to the 
interconnected nature of international disputes that involve legal, 
political, social, cultural, and economic issues.  Furthermore, these 
distinctions can be illusory because it is often difficult to accurately 
assess and separate legal and political dimensions of a dispute at 
the onset of the situation.  These factors contribute to 
fragmentation between IDR methods when parties frame their 
choices as binary, electing one form of IDR over all others. 
The descriptive framework of the IDR system also conflates the 
choice of method with achieving a particular objective instead of 
understanding them as tools that can be used to achieve a variety 
of aims.  It supports assumptions that particular methods work for 
certain categories of cases but does not foster careful and nuanced 
assessment of the dispute before selecting or designing an 
appropriate process.  Rigid understandings promote value 
judgments and promote the tendency to substitute one method’s 
 
123 See generally PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS, 
http://www.pict-pcti.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (providing examples of this 
descriptive approach. The menu could be extended to include political methods 
and various forms of military intervention such as peacekeeping or humanitarian 
intervention). 
124 See Geir Ulfstein, Institutions and Competences, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45, 67-68 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 
2009) (noting analogous concerns in the arena of international institutions: the 
relationship between institutions is characterized by functional differentiation, 
and fragmentation causes wasted resources and conflicting objectives); Cesare P. 
R. Romano, Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue, 41 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 755, 755 (2009) (discussing how international court 
jurisprudence is interrelated). 
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evaluative criteria for another.125  For example, if the value of IDR 
methods is based on criteria specific to adjudication—its ability to 
enforce outcomes through a legally binding process—then this de-
emphasizes the value of other options.  When measured against 
this criterion, voluntary, nonbinding IDR methods are perceived as 
less valuable.126  Meanwhile, the value of mediation is in its ability 
to compel outcomes based on the power of persuasion and 
acculturation, not coercion.  Measuring mediation against criteria 
developed for adjudication ignores the important benefits 
mediation provides, such as its ability to create new norms, not 
merely persuade parties to conform to existing ones,127 which 
makes mediation preferable in situations where the long-term 
relationship between parties must stay intact. 
Third, there is no framework for understanding how to 
systematically integrate the use of different and multiple methods 
across forums.  This deficiency obscures the reality that many 
international conflicts and disputes are addressed through 
multiple processes.  But there is no place in the current IDR system 
to classify approaches that use multiple IDR methods sequentially, 
or approaches that integrate aspects of different methods into one 
process.  Thus, they remain categorized as ad hoc methods. 
Fourth, this deficiency also fosters fragmentation between 
institutions within the IDR system.  The International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) considered the impact of diversification and 
fragmentation on international law in its 2006 report.128  While it 
did not focus specifically on procedural or institutional 
fragmentation, other scholars have.129  One concern is that the 
 
125 See Fuller, supra note 103, at 115 (discussing the function of mediation in 
facilitating negotiation in collective bargaining relationships).  
126 See generally Chinkin, supra note 81 (providing examples that further 
display the decreased value of mediation when measured against adjudication 
specific criteria). 
127 See Fuller, supra note 103, at 307–08 (noting that mediation both forces 
awareness of current social norms and contributes to the formulation of 
innovative norms). 
128 See generally Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
(Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC Report] (report of the study group detailing the 
complications arising from the increasing diversity of international law tribunals). 
129 See, e.g., STEPHENS, supra note 74, at 304–42 (looking at the fragmentary 
effects of multiple international courts on international environmental law); 
Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International 
Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 117 (1998) (exploring the fragmentary 
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proliferation of international courts and the judicialization of 
international disputes have led to a multiplicity of dispute 
resolution options that are uncoordinated.  If courts provide 
different opinions on similar matters, this may lead to fragmented 
jurisprudence and judicial practices.130  This concern is multiplied 
when considering other forms of IDR.  For example, the ICJ could 
address a legal aspect of a dispute while mediation is being used to 
resolve extra-legal issues without either group recognizing or 
coordinating with the efforts of the other.  If the legal question is 
adjudicated and the political interests are mediated, how should 
these outcomes be integrated to achieve common goals, such as 
violence reduction or stable governance?  Answering questions 
such as this demands developing a more accurate descriptive 
understanding of the relationships between the methods and 
institutions of the IDR system. 
4. RECOGNIZING HYBRID APPROACHES TO IDR: MULTIPLE 
METHODS AND MIXED METHODS 
The benefits of IDR extend beyond single method approaches 
but the system fails to provide a framework for understanding 
 
effects of a high number of tribunals on international law); Gerhard Hafner, Pros 
and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849, 
849 (2004) (detailing the upside and downside of procedural and institutional 
fragmentation in international law); Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy 
to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?, 
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259, 271 (2007) (proposing an institutional hierarchy as 
a possible solution to the problem of fragmentation in international law). 
130 See generally STEPHENS, supra note 74, at 304-42 (detailing the lack of 
uniformity in the application of international environmental law caused by the 
proliferation of ruling bodies); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Unity of Application of 
International Law at the Global Level and the Responsibility of Judges, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (2007) (proposing an institutional hierarchy and uniform judicial 
application of law as solutions to the lack of unity in the enforcement of 
international law); Rosalyn Higgins, supra note 66, at 1 (2003) (detailing the 
detrimental effects on coherent human rights protection in Europe stemming from 
the disparate rulings of different tribunals); Bruno Simma, Universality of 
International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265 (2009) 
(exploring the challenges posed by the proliferation of international tribunals and 
courts).  But see Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between 
Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (viewing international law not as 
a true legal system in the national sense and not subject to the same concerns 
about fragmentation); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of 
International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 553 (2002) 
(suggesting that concerns regarding the fragmentation of international law may 
be exaggerated). 
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what these options are or how they fit into the overall structure.  
This Part examines the use of IDR beyond single method 
approaches and identifies two additional categories: (1) multiple 
method approaches, defined here as the use of more than one IDR 
method in the same case, in sequential order;131 and (2) mixed 
method approaches, defined here as the integration of more than 
one IDR method into a hybrid process where different methods are 
used at the same time.  This Part begins by analyzing the 
application of multiple method approaches in a variety of cases 
and identifies the current institutional capacity for its use.  The Part 
further considers a case study that illustrates a mixed method 
approach.  I conclude by considering how these hybrid approaches 
can extend the practice of IDR in innovative ways that mitigate the 
limitations identified in Part 3. 
4.1. The Use of Multiple Methods in IDR 
This Part explores how multiple methods have been used 
sequentially in the course of addressing the same dispute.  First, 
parties use negotiation or mediation to reach an agreement to 
submit the dispute to adjudication.  For example, in the Pedra 
Branca dispute between Malaysia and Singapore, both countries 
engaged in negotiations prior to referring the case to adjudication 
before the ICJ.132  Moreover, they also used these methods after 
adjudication to achieve further cooperation.  After the ICJ 
determined that Singapore possessed sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca and Malaysia had sovereignty over Middle Rocks,133 the 
 
131 See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. 
Wheeler eds., 1979) (describing examples of multiple method approaches in the 
United States such as the combination of litigation and mediation in multi-door 
courthouses). 
132 The nations negotiated the terms of the Special Agreement to submit the 
dispute to the ICJ.  See S. JAYAKUMAR & TOMMY KOH, PEDRA BRANCA: THE ROAD TO 
THE WORLD COURT 35 (2009) (detailing the negotiations leading up to the 
resolution by the ICJ).  See generally Tan Hsien-Li, Case Concerning Sovereignty Over 
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), 
12 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. & CONTRIBUTORS 257 (2008) (describing the territorial dispute 
in detail); Coalter G. Lathrop, International Decisions: Sovereignty Over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 828 (2008) 
(examining the dispute in the ICJ, its resolution, and the parties’ acquiescence). 
133 See Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge (Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, 102 (May 23) (providing a 
factual basis to support its conclusion that Pedro Branca belongs to Singapore). 
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countries developed a joint technical commission to delimit the 
maritime boundary in the area.134 
Second, parties use mediation to resolve a dispute when other 
approaches have failed.  For example, in the Thailand-Philippines 
dispute over tuna exports, the parties agreed to submit the dispute 
to mediation if consultations facilitated by the EU Trade 
Commissioner failed to produce a settlement.135  On September 4, 
2002, the parties submitted a letter to the WTO Secretary-General 
requesting mediation; on October 16, 2002, WTO Deputy Director-
General Rufus Yerxa was appointed mediator136 pursuant to 
Article 5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”).137  Yerxa issued an advisory 
opinion on December 20, 2002, which called for the European 
Community (“EC”) to establish a quota and tariff rates; and on 
June 5, 2003, after months of lobbying by Thailand and the 
Philippines, the EC adopted Yerxa’s recommendation in EU 
Council Regulation No. 975/2003.138  The use of mediation in this 
context was directive, with Yerxa offering his own solution to the 
parties. 
In other cases, non-judicial forms of IDR are used after 
adjudication to facilitate implementation of the award and/or 
resolve outstanding issues.  For example, PCA awards have 
 
134 See generally Li Xueying, Navigating the Rocks Ahead May Be Tricky: But 
Experts Confident Any Unresolved Issues Will Be Ironed Out, STRAITS TIMES, May 24, 
2008, available at http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/pedra 
_branca_belongs_to_singapore.html (explaining the issues facing the joint 
technical commission); ICJ Awards Pedra Branca's Sovereignty to Singapore, 
CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singapore 
localnews/view/349592/1/.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (detailing the 
judgment of the ICJ and the creation of the joint technical commission). 
135 Nilaratna Xuto, Thailand: Conciliating a Dispute on Tuna Exports to the EC, in 
MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES 555, 560 
(Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005), available at www.wto.org/english 
/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case40_e.htm (detailing the agreement by the 
parties to submit to mediation, should the consultations fail). 
136 Request for Mediation by the Philippines, Thailand and the European 
Communities, Communication from the Director-General, para. 5, WT/GC/66 (Oct. 
16, 2002). 
137 See id. para. 4 (providing that the appointed mediator will follow 
guidelines set by the DSU).  See generally Faizel Ismail, The Role of the Chair in the 
WTO Negotiations from the Potsdam Collapse in June 2007-June 2008, 43 J. WORLD 
TRADE 1145, 1149–50 (2009) (noting the positive contribution the chair served in 
agenda management and brokerage during the negotiations.) 
138 See Xuto, supra note 135, at 563 (outlining how the parties approached 
mediation as an alternative should traditional trade negotiations fail). 
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acknowledged the value of using such approaches, in addition to 
adjudication, to address extra-legal aspects of a case139 and have 
promoted the additional use of non-judicial IDR in order to 
support decisions. This was the case in the Abyei arbitration 
between the Government of Sudan and the People’s Liberation 
Army of Sudan.140  At issue was a dispute about boundary 
demarcation, oil, water, and grazing rights.  The PCA addressed 
the dispute by dividing the territory between the two parties. 
The process of arbitrating this dispute unfolded in the 
following way.  The parties signed the Arbitration Agreement on 
July 7, 2008, authorizing the referral of the dispute to the PCA for 
final and binding arbitration.  At issue was whether or not the 
Abyei Boundaries Commission (“ABC”), established by the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“CPA”),141 exceeded its 
mandate under the CPA to delimit and demarcate an area 
identified as the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.  The parties agreed 
in the Arbitration Agreement to authorize the PCA, upon a finding 
that the Commission did exceed its mandate to delimit and 
demarcate the area in dispute.  The PCA determined that the ABC 
did exceed its mandate in part.  The PCA redrew the boundaries 
and in doing so, reduced the Abyei areas and demarcated the oil 
fields to the territory belonging to the North.  In its decision, the 
PCA determined that it is now up to the Parties to take the next 
step, noting the need to develop a “survey team to demarcate the 
Abyei Area as delimited by this Award,” and issuing its hopes 
“that the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation visible throughout 
these proceedings, particularly during the oral pleadings last April, 
 
139 See Nejib Jibril, Note, The Binding Dilemma: From Bakassi to Badme–Making 
States Comply with Territorial Decisions of International Judicial Bodies, 19 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 633, 662-67 (2004) (concluding that pressure and involvement from 
the international community are needed to create binding arbitration agreements). 
140 See Gov’t Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei 
Arb.), Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306 (settling the dispute over the Abyei Area by 
resolving conflicts over the boundary lines). 
141 See The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the 
Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army, Gov’t Sudan-Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Jan. 9, 2005, available at www.aec-
sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf (outlining the terms of the comprehensive peace 
agreement established by the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army on Jan. 9, 
2005). 
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will continue to animate the Parties on this matter.”142  Despite the 
concerns raised in Judge Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh’s dissenting 
opinion, both parties announced that they would accept and abide 
by the PCA’s ruling.143 
The Abyei arbitration illustrates how a legal process allocated 
ownership rights, demarcated territory, and imparted 
responsibility on the parties for pursuing additional methods 
toward reconciliation.  However, the Tribunal recognized that the 
Award was a “distinct stage in the peace process,” and, by 
implication, not the only phase.144  The precise nature and timing 
of these additional methods remains unspecified.  Thus, the 
Presidency of the Republic Sudan remains obligated to implement 
the Award and address outstanding issues.145 
The Pedra Branca dispute, Thailand-Philippines dispute, and 
the Abyei arbitration show how different IDR methods were used 
in a sequential manner.  These cases demonstrate that multiple 
method IDR is being used in mediation. 
4.2. Procedural and Institutional Capacity for Multiple Method IDR 
There are several IDR venues that have the institutional 
capacity to provide multiple method approaches.  As Part 3 
identified, the institutional capacity for international mediation is 
limited so this Part will focus on forums that provide a mix of 
judicial settlement, arbitration, conciliation, other IDR methods or 
a combination of any of these fora. 
The PCA provides arbitration, conciliation, and fact-finding.146  
Only states, their entities, and international organizations may 
 
142 Gov’t Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Final 
Award, para. 266 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306 (final award in the Abyei arbitration); see also 
Hans, Abyei Arbitration Award, PEACE PALACE LIBRARY BLOG (July 22, 2009, 3:18 
PM), http://peacepalacelibrary-weekly.blogspot.com/2009/07/abyei-arbitration-
award.html (summarizing the key elements of the final award of the Abyei 
Arbitration).  
143 See Hans, supra note 142, para. 7 (noting that the parties announced they 
would abide by the award). 
144 Gov’t Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Final 
Award, para. 768 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage 
.asp?pag_id=1306 (final award in the Abyei arbitration). 
145 See id. para. 769 (noting that it is the responsibility of the President of the 
Republic of Sudan to ensure execution of the award). 
146 See PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. OPTIONAL CONCILIATION RULES, available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/CONCENG.pdf [hereinafter PCA 
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access these.147  The PCA’s conciliation and fact-finding services are 
governed by the 1907 Hague Convention, the Rules of Conciliation, 
and the 1997 Optional Rules for Fact-finding Commissions of 
Inquiry.148  PCA conciliation panels consist of one to three 
conciliators who “attempt to reach an amicable settlement” in any 
manner appropriate, taking into account the wishes of the parties, 
including proposing terms for settlement.149  While the PCA has 
the capacity to offer all three of these IDR methods, it is less 
apparent how they have been used in a sequential manner. 
ITLOS operates as an independent international judicial body, 
established by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (“UNCLOS”).150  Unlike other forums, ITLOS is accessible 
in certain circumstances to private individuals and corporations in 
addition to states, their entities, and international organizations.151  
ITLOS provides arbitration and conciliation, as well as provisional 
measures that offer creative approaches to dispute resolution.152  
For example, in the Malaysia-Singapore case, the Tribunal embraced 
a dispute-management approach by calling for “the establishment 
 
OPTIONAL CONCILIATION RULES] (“The purpose of these Rules is to provide a 
convenient basis for mutual agreement of parties on practical procedures that are 
useful in the conciliation process.”); PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. OPTIONAL RULES FOR 
FACT-FINDING COMM’NS OF INQUIRY, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/INQENG.pdf (establishing optional rules of fact-finding 
which parties may adopt at their discretion); 1907 Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of Int’l Disputes arts. 9, 15, Oct. 18 1907, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/1907ENG.pdf [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention] 
(providing that the PCA may provide fact-finding to assist the Commission of 
Inquiry and that the PCA “shall place its offices and staff at the disposal of the 
Contracting Powers for the use of the Commission of Inquiry”). 
147 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 105–20 (detailing the institutional 
and procedural aspects of arbitration before the PCA). 
148 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, ch. 2 (establishing the PCA 
and its procedure); see also MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 72–77 (providing a general 
overview of the fact-finding and conciliation process). 
149 See PCA OPTIONAL CONCILIATION RULES, supra note 146, arts. 3, 7 
(indicating that between one to three conciliators may be employed and that 
“[t]he conciliator assists the parties . . . in their attempt to reach an amicable 
settlement of their dispute.”). 
150 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 48, art. 
284 (describing procedures for conciliation by a State Party).  
151 Id. annex VI, art. 20 para. 1 (”The Tribunal shall be open to States 
Parties.”). 
152 See generally MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 190–203 (describing the 
conciliation and arbitration framework established by UNCLOS and the 
establishment of ITLOS). 
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of a group of independent experts to study the land reclamation 
issues” and make recommendations.153 
The WTO DSB is a political entity responsible for providing 
WTO members with dispute settlement, supervising consultations 
between disputing parties, adopting Appellate Body panel reports, 
and supervising implementation of awards.154  The goal of the 
WTO DSB is to protect established rights of WTO members and 
provide a predictable and secure method for achieving decisions 
regarding WTO disputes.155  The governing rules and procedures 
provide disputing parties with the option of engaging in direct 
consultations.156  In addition, parties may elect to pursue third-
party intervention procedures of good offices, conciliation, and 
mediation as an option between consultations and legally binding 
decision-making by the ad hoc panel.157  These have proven 
particularly satisfactory in disputes where there is a power 
imbalance—whether perceived or real—between the nations 
involved.158  The novelty of the WTO DSB as an IDR process is that 
it blends “diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and 
adjudication.”159 
ICSID provides arbitration and conciliation for investment 
disputes among members to the Convention, which includes states 
as well as their nationals (both individuals and companies).160  
 
153 MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 68. 
154 See id. at 73–74 (outlining the general responsibilities of the WTO DSB). 
155 See id. at 72–73 (commenting on the motivation for establishing the WTO 
dispute settlement system).   
156 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (outlining the rules 
and procedures for initiation of a consultation). 
157 See id. art. 5 (outlining the rules and procedures for good offices, 
conciliation, and mediation). 
158 See Xuto, supra note 135, at 563 (”This case is a good example of how 
developing country members were able to use their WTO rights to secure more 
equitable treatment from a developed country trading partner.”); see also DSU, 
supra note 156, art. 24(2) (requiring that the Director-General or Chairman of the 
DSB offer good offices, conciliation, and mediation upon the request of “a least-
developed country”). 
159 Surya P. Subedi, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a New Technique 
for Settling Disputes in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 173, 173 (Duncan French et al. eds., 2010). 
160 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States, arts. 25(1)–(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
(outlining the scope of the ICSID’s jurisdiction).  The Additional Facility Rules 
also allow for cases involving parties not contracted to the Convention or cases 
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Typically, arbitration occurs through a tribunal while conciliation 
occurs through a commission that is convened through the 
agreement of the disputing parties and in accordance with ICSID 
Convention provisions.161  The use of conciliation is minimal in 
comparison to arbitration.  As of December 31, 2009, ICSID had 
completed six conciliation cases, representing 2% of its total 
caseload.162  However, the ability to blend arbitration and 
conciliation has been suggested in at least two ways.  First, parties 
are not prevented from resorting to arbitration if they choose to use 
conciliation and it fails.163  Second, the parties may request that an 
arbitrator assist them by serving a conciliation role.164 
While this review is not a comprehensive identification of the 
entirety of institutional capacity for multiple method IDR, it 
provides an introduction to the venues capable of providing this 
approach. 
4.3. Mixing Methods? The Case of The Red Sea Islands Dispute 
In addition to the multiple method approaches described 
above, IDR methods can be combined in a more complex manner.  
The following case study of the Red Sea Islands Dispute provides 
 
involving non-investment issues.  See RULES GOVERNING THE ADDITIONAL FACILITY 
FOR THE ADMIN. OF PROCEEDINGS BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES art. 2, available at, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID 
/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf (granting ICSID jurisdiction over 
certain additional parties). 
161 See Nassib G. Ziadé, ICSID Conciliation, 13 NEWS FROM ICSID 3, 5–6 
(describing ICSID conciliation as having similar procedures as arbitration from 
the initiation stage through the constitution of the Commission, after which the 
proceedings differ because the process is non-adversarial in character and the 
Conciliation Commission has no power to impose a decision on the parties, but 
serves “‘to clarify the issues in dispute . . . and to endeavor to bring about 
agreement between them upon mutually acceptable terms’” under Article 34(1) of 
the ICSID Convention). 
162 See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 
THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS, 8 (2010) (indicating the breakdown of the type 
of proceedings registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility 
Rules: 285, 89%, were arbitration cases; 28, 9%, were additional facility arbitration 
cases; and 6, 2%, were conciliation cases); see also MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17, 
at 128 (stating that as of September 30, 2009, 6 of 177 completed ICSID cases were 
conciliation cases). 
163 Ziadé, supra note 161, at 3 (stating that the ICSID does not prevent parties 
from agreeing to first resort to conciliation and to subsequently arbitrate). 
164 Id. at 7 (stating that parties sometimes seek help of arbitrators to “facilitate 
an early amicable settlement”).  Conversely, ICSID Arbitration Rule 1(4) prevents 
a formal conciliator from being appointed to the Arbitral Tribunal. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SPAIN.DOC 11/23/2010  3:49 PM 
38 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
one illustrative example.  Yemen and Eritrea had a dispute over 
three groups of islands located in the Red Sea:  Greater Hanish, 
Mohabbakah, and Haycock.  The Greater Hanish island group was 
home to Yemeni fishing communities.  Eritrea’s armed forces 
stationed on the island during its conflict with Ethiopia remained.  
In November of 1995, Eritrea ordered all Yemeni nationals to leave 
the islands in response to their claim that Yemen had sent armed 
forces to the area.  On December 15, a low-level armed conflict 
broke out and Eritrean forces took Yemeni POWs.  At issue were 
questions of sovereignty, access, and rights to tourism, fishing, and 
minerals.165  On December 17, 1995, a cease-fire was reached by the 
presidents of both nations with each nation claiming control of the 
islands. 
Various forms of IDR were initially tried with some attempts 
occurring simultaneously.166  Eritrea suggested that they submit 
the matter to the ICJ for decision while engaging in simultaneous 
troop withdrawal.167  Yemen sought the return of its POWs and 
Eritrean withdrawal as pre-conditions to negotiations, which 
Eritrea rejected.168  Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister visited the islands 
on December 21, 1995 and later proposed the following agreement: 
return of the POWs, mutual withdrawal of troops monitored by a 
neutral party and submission of the dispute to the ICJ.169  After 
Eritrea returned Yemeni POWs, Yemen refused the proposal to 
conduct simultaneous troop withdrawal.  The parties could not 
agree on which side would be the first to withdraw.170  On 
December 23, Egypt began mediation and suggested that both 
 
165 See Jeffrey Lefebvre, Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the 
Hanish Islands Dispute, 52 MIDDLE E. J. 367, 373–76 (1998) (detailing the roots of the 
conflict). 
166 See B.G. Ramcharan, Preventing War between Eritrea and Yemen over the 
Hanish Islands (1996), in CONFLICT PREVENTION IN PRACTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
JIM SUTTERLIN 157, 157–68 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 2005) (tracking the progression of 
mediation methods utilized to prevent armed conflict between Yemen and 
Eritrea). 
167 See Daniel J. Dzurek, Eritrea-Yemen Dispute over the Hanish Islands, 1996 
IBRU BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 70, 73 (providing an example of Eritrea’s attempts at 
IDR). 
168 See id. at 72–73 (explaining the respective demands of Yemen and Eritrea 
during their failed attempts at mediation). 
169 See id. at 73 (documenting Ethiopian involvement in mediations between 
Yemen and Eritrea). 
170 Id. 
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countries participate in a summit to resolve the conflict; Yemen 
rejected this proposal.171 
Meanwhile, after the armed conflict, U.N. Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali sent personal letters to the presidents of both 
nations urging diplomacy and military restraint.  On December 29, 
1995, he went to Yemen to mediate.172  Under Secretary-General 
Ismat Kittani met with representatives from both countries and 
France.  The President of the Security Council also held meetings 
urging support for French mediation efforts.173  The selection of the 
mediator was a complex process involving a variety of regional 
groups.174  These efforts persuaded both nations to accept French 
mediation, which, under the direction of French Ambassador 
Gutmann, monitored and observed the situation and created a 
reliable record of events.175  A mediated agreement was reached on 
May 21, 1996, though it was soon threatened when Eritrean forces 
reoccupied the Greater Hanish islands that August.176  One of the 
outstanding issues was the scope of the dispute.  Eritrea claimed 
that all the island groups were in dispute while Yemen maintained 
that the issue was limited to the presence of Eritrean force located 
on the Greater Hanish islands group.177  There were five additional 
rounds of mediation after this event that eventually led to a second 
agreement on October 3, 1996178 when, at the suggestion of the 
 
171 See id. at 74 (noting that Yemen preferred the mediation proposal 
presented by the French). 
172 See 416 Red Sea Islands (1995), ICB DATA VIEWER, www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb 
/dataviewer (open the drop-down menu entitled “select a crisis”; then select “416 
– Red Sea Islands – 1995”) (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (analyzing the involvement 
of U.N. General-Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali). 
173 See Ramcharan, supra note 166, at 167 (explaining the Security Council’s 
concern over a continued Yemen-Eritrea conflict). 
174 See Lefebvre, supra note 165, at 376–78 (noting that the League of Arab 
States, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and allegedly Israel were 
involved in trying to influence the mediation process). 
175 See Ramcharan, supra note 166, at 168 (noting that French mediation 
attempts eventually led to a peaceful resolution of the dispute). 
176 See Lefebvre, supra note 165, at 381 (documenting the steps taken by 
Francis Gutmann, the French diplomat, to mediate the dispute). 
177 See Dzurek, supra note 167, at 74 (concluding that Eritrea and Yemen were 
simply “talking past one another”). 
178 See Lefebvre, supra note 165, at 381 (analyzing the hostile environment 
present just before Yemen and Eritrea agreed to submit their dispute to an 
international tribunal). 
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French, Yemen and Eritrea decided to submit the dispute to 
arbitration at the PCA.179 
 In 1998, the PCA issued its first Award, The 1998 Eritrea/Yemen 
Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute Award (Phase I), where 
it awarded the Mohabbakah and Haycock island groups to Eritrea 
and the Hanish Islands to Yemen.180  This decision confirmed the 
“preeminence of evidence of actual and effective occupation as a 
source of title to territory over claims of historic title.”181  The 
Award states:  “[i]n the exercise of its sovereignty over these 
islands, Yemen shall ensure that the traditional fishing regime of 
free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and 
Yemen shall be preserved for the benefit of the lives and 
livelihoods of this poor and industrious order of men,” thus noting 
the need to preserve shared interests despite legal rights to 
sovereignty.182  In 1999, the PCA issued a second award, The 1999 
Eritrea/Yemen Maritime Delimitation Award (Phase II), delimiting 
maritime boundaries and clarifying the fishing privileges provided 
for in the first Award.  The Award states that “[t]he traditional 
fishing regime is not an entitlement in common to resources nor is 
it a shared right in them.  Rather, it entitles both Eritrean and 
Yemeni fishermen to engage in artisanal fishing around the islands 
which, in its Award on Sovereignty, the Tribunal attributed to 
Yemen.”183  Eritrea and Yemen accepted the findings of the arbitral 
panel with Eritrea stating that the award will “pave the way for a 
harmonious relationship between the littoral states of the Red Sea,” 
while Yemen called the Award the “culmination of a great 
diplomatic effort.”184  As a practical matter, it remains to be 
 
179 See id. at 379–80 (noting that this dispute occurred within the context of 
Yemen’s border dispute with Saudi Arabia and the Eritrean government facing 
increased opposition by internal groups). 
180 See Eritrea v. Yemen, Award Phase 1, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998) http://www 
.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY Phase I.pdf (awarding territorial sovereignty to 
Yemen). 
181 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in 
the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation, 2000 IBRU BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 66, 78. 
182 Eritrea v. Yemen, Award Phase 1, para. 526 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998) 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY Phase I.pdf. 
183 Eritrea v. Yemen, Award Phase 2, at para. 103 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999) 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY Phase II.pdf. 
184 See Kwiatkowska, supra note 181, at 67 (quoting Eritrean Foreign Minister 
Haile Woldense and the Yemeni Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulla 
Mohammed Al-Saidi, respectively). 
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determined what specific steps Eritrea and Yemen will employ in 
order to achieve such collaborative relations. 
4.4. Defining and Valuing Mixed Methods 
The Red Sea Islands Dispute illustrates the complexities involved 
when IDR methods are employed in an integrated manner that 
goes beyond single method and multiple method approaches.  
While defining mixed methods is difficult, conceptually, it is an 
IDR approach that blends more than one method, or aspects of 
different methods, into a single process.185 
There are several approaches in other fields that clarify the 
concept of mixed methods.  In alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”), mediation and arbitration have been combined into 
hybrid processes now recognized as “med-arb” and “arb-med.”186  
These processes, which developed out of necessity when third-
party neutrals were called upon to provide both arbitration and 
mediation services during a dispute, have evolved from ad hoc 
practices into a recognized form of dispute resolution.187  In the 
international context, the United Nations Compensation 
Commission (“UNCC”), which was established by the U.N. 
Security Council to determine and process claims to the victims of 
Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait, provides a variety of IDR functions.188  
The Panels of Commissioners provided quasi-judicial services in 
making determinations about which parties were entitled to 
compensation.  The Secretariat has served in both fact-finding and 
mediation capacities to assist in the formation of agreements 
between members of the Governing Council.189  In the area of 
 
185 This is a working definition and I look forward to additional comments. 
186 See generally Barry C. Bartel, Comment, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of 
Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis, and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661 
(1991) (explaining how these processes come about and are implemented). 
187 For articles exploring med-arb and arb-med, see generally William H. 
Ross & Donald E. Conlon, Note, Hybrid Forms of Third-Party Dispute Resolution: 
Theoretical Implications of Combining Mediation and Arbitration, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
416 (2000) and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of 
Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997).  
188 For additional information about the form and function of the UNCC, see 
generally JOSÉ ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 424–28 
(2005) and UNITED NATIONS COMP. COMM’N, http://www.uncc.ch (last visited Oct. 
24, 2010).  
189 See The Secretariat, UNITED NATIONS COMP. COMM’N http://www.uncc.ch 
/secretar.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (explaining the role of the secretariat 
within the UNCC). 
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international criminal law, the mixing of judicial settlement with 
transformative IDR methods has been employed.  For example, 
Gacaca Courts in post-conflict Rwanda that directly involved local 
communities were utilized alongside national courts and an 
international tribunal to serve the collective goal of achieving 
justice and reconciliation.190  While these examples embody the 
concept of integrating different methods into one hybrid process, 
the IDR field needs to track where and how mixed method 
approaches are being employed in order to further define the 
concept. 191 
Despite the need to develop a generally accepted conceptual 
framework, it is worth considering the value of mixed method 
IDR.  First, mixed methods are capable of providing benefits that 
single methods cannot.  If methods are combined in a 
complementary manner that enhances the strengths of different 
processes and mitigates weaknesses, this may offer superior 
capacity.192  One critique identified in Part 3 was that mediation 
lacks the institutional framework and financial support that 
adjudication enjoys.  Yet, the two processes need not be mutually 
exclusive.  The ICJ can enhance the problem-solving qualities of 
mediation by providing the institutional capacity of a powerful 
framework that establishes a protective environment as parties 
engage in the cooperative, and sometimes vulnerable, venture of 
problem solving.  At the same time, mediation can pick up where 
legal settlement stops by assisting parties in resolving matters that 
extend beyond legal questions into political, environmental and 
social matters.  Such approaches can enhance the complementary 
dynamics of power and cooperation.  Furthermore, the concept of 
combining substructures to create “mutually supportive” legal 
 
190 See Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional 
Context: The Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 86, 86–87 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009) 
(describing how the Gacaca Courts operated in Rwanda and noting the use of 
similar participatory processes in post-conflict Sierra Leone and East Timor). 
191 See Schneider, supra note 54, at 796 (noting examples of mixed processes at 
the Iran Claims Tribunal, Swiss Claims Tribunal, and Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary 
claims commission and arguing that “the international community . . . has focused 
on balancing diplomacy with the need for trials”). 
192 See Dukes, supra note 96, at 194 (identifying the benefits and weaknesses 
of environmental conflict resolution processes used in the United States and citing 
a case study by Kloppenberg (2002) analyzing the management and outcome of 75 
environmental cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon which 
illustrate the reasons why isolated processes cause ineffective, poor results). 
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systems is not new.193  It has been employed in environmental law, 
trade194 and international criminal law.195 
Second, mixed method IDR is particularly useful for 
international conflicts because they are typically complex in their 
involvement of legal, economic, cultural, and political disputes and 
because they involve a diverse set of stakeholders.  Given the 
critiques of the limitations of adjudication and mediation 
presented in Part 3, neither process is typically capable of 
providing adequate recourse on its own.  Adjudication provides 
legal settlement that parties generally consider to be legitimate and 
fair.  However, the ICJ and other bodies often address narrow legal 
arguments, but rarely opine on more complex disputes because 
they lack the authority to decide non-legal matters.  Mediation is 
capable of addressing the full array of issues that are present in 
resource disputes but lacks the power, institutional capacity, and 
authority to constrain state behavior and enforce outcomes over 
the long term.  Integrating aspects of these and other IDR processes 
like joint fact-finding and agenda setting into one process has the 
potential to provide a multi-faceted approach capable of 
responding to the more complex cases of international conflict and 
disputes. 
These implications are a starting point for additional research.  
Scholars need to better assess how each IDR process addresses 
aspects of a dispute and when processes should be combined.  
 
193 As understood in the context of determining jurisdictional 
complementarity in international criminal law, particularly regarding the balance 
between the ICC and national courts, combining substructures is not new.  See 
Jennifer S. Easterday, Deciding the Fate of Complementarity: A Colombian Case Study, 
26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 52–53 (2002) (noting, as an example of 
complementarity, that a case will not be admissible before the ICC if a national 
court system is willing and able to hear it); see generally Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The 
Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal 
Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869 (2002) (addressing the application of complementarity 
in various legal contexts including within the ICC and the U.N. Security Council). 
194 See generally Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Effective Implementation of 
Intersecting Public International Regimes: Environment, Development and Trade Law, in 
PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION 213 (Teruo Komori & Karel Wellens eds., 2009) (noting how 
“mutually supportive” legal regimes can increase effectiveness in environmental 
and trade law). 
195 See generally Shuichi Furuya, The Principle of Complementarity in Reality: 
Who Actually Applies It and in What Way under the ICC System?, in PUBLIC INTEREST 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 
194, at 293 (discussing how the ICC system complements national jurisdiction and 
noting some of the system’s failures).   
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Hybrid approaches are not always appropriate and the benefits of 
adjudication or mediation as distinct processes remain.  
Developing understanding about the use and impact of the hybrid 
approaches identified in this Part remains the task of future 
scholarship. 
5. WHY INTEGRATION MATTERS IN RETHINKING THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF IDR 
This Article has argued that there are three core challenges to 
the rationale behind the existing architecture of the IDR system.  
The justification for prioritizing state-centric adjudication practices 
and forums is challenged by the fact that conflicts posing a threat 
to international peace and security increasingly involve non-state 
actors and extra-legal issues.  The failure to develop mediation 
capacity at the international level is in tension with states’ 
preference for it among IDR options.  The IDR system is structured 
in a manner that fosters process and institutional fragmentation 
and fails to incorporate hybrid approaches into the framework.  In 
response, this Part argues that the IDR system should be 
restructured to promote the integration of IDR methods and 
institutions in order to increase capacity, mitigate fragmentation, 
and conform to the broader paradigm shift that is taking place in 
this field. 
5.1. Addressing Multiplicity and Fragmentation 
This Article has identified the multiplicity of IDR methods and 
institutions including new approaches that go beyond the use of a 
single method.  However, these forms have yet to be organized 
into a coherent and functional structure that clarifies the relational 
web between them.  This level of knowledge is necessary in order 
to understand why approaches succeed or fail.  For example, there 
is no framework for understanding why, in the Laguna del Desierto 
Dispute (Argentina v. Chile), the ICJ’s opinion led to a negotiated 
settlement196 but in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute 
(Honduras v. El Salvador), referral of the dispute to the ICJ 
temporarily led to the escalation of tensions while the case was 
 
196 See GUO, supra note 112, at 14–16 (noting that an ICJ decision facilitated 
settlement of the Laguna del Desierto Dispute). 
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pending.197  Absent some form of coordination, the relationships 
between IDR methods will remain ill defined and ambiguous, 
making it difficult to incorporate complex IDR approaches into the 
international legal framework.198 
The lack of an adequate framework results in institutional 
fragmentation in IDR.  Fragmentation in international law has been 
considered as a substantive problem199 as well as an institutional 
one.200  One critique that this Article makes is that the use of 
mediation, multiple methods, and mixed methods is largely ad hoc 
and may be occurring in a way that is contributing to a fragmented 
system.  Absent comprehensive research about the IDR system, 
there is currently no way to systematically track IDR use across 
methods and institutions in order to determine if fragmentation is 
a real problem.   
In order for a system to be coherent and functional, its 
substructures need to be organized and coordinated.201  For IDR, 
this means developing a framework that comprehensively 
identifies methods, their strengths and limits, as well as the 
institutions that provide them.  It also requires a structure that 
allows for integration to occur between methods and 
institutions.202 
 
197 See id. at 16 (citing M. Orozco, Boundary Disputes in Central America: Past 
Trends and Present Developments, 14 PENSAMIENTO PROPIO 99 (2001)) (noting that the 
ICJ judgment “raised the stakes . . . of the bilateral dispute” and strained bilateral 
relations “while the definitive delimitation on the ground was still pending”). 
198 See generally Bilder, supra note 27, at 10–11 (exploring the complexities of 
IDR by posing various questions that may arise in an international dispute). 
199 See ILC Report, supra note 128, para. 487 (discussing the lack of 
substantive international law and arguing that international law should be 
structured to better harmonize the coordination and organization of varying 
autonomous international legal rules and institutions). 
200 See generally sources cited supra note 129 (discussing, among other topics, 
institutional fragmentation in international law). 
201 See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 
31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279, 285 (2005) (discussing 
potential difficulties that may result from a fragmented international system 
where various obligations often conflict with one another).  See generally Joost 
Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-
Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903 (2004) (arguing for recognition of the 
overlap between fragmented bodies of international law  and promotion of a more 
unified system where individual international legal bodies take account of the 
laws and precedents of other international legal bodies). 
202 See Ulfstein, supra note 124, at 67–71 (discussing the benefits and 
limitations of an integrated institutional framework). 
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This concept—developing integrated frameworks—has been 
presented as a solution to the problem of fragmentation in 
international law.203  ICJ Judge Rosalyn Higgins proposes the idea 
of integration through information sharing—a preferable 
alternative to pluralistic legal approaches204—as a solution for 
fragmentation in international courts.205  Other scholars share 
similar ideas.  Zaring has identified how the interlinkage of 
international institutions, in order to understand the entire system 
in addition to its parts, increases the effectiveness of international 
governance.206  Berman argues that there is a need to embrace 
multiple ways to mediate conflicts, reconcile competing norms and 
allow hybrid forms because this provides a more accurate 
description of the world and potentially provides useful alternative 
approaches.207  The literature on Dispute Systems Design 
(“DSD”)208 suggests that integrated approaches informed by an 
 
203 See Higgins, supra note 66, at 15–20 (suggesting that the ICJ can help 
prompt integration between judicial and other dispute resolution forums across 
regions and cultures but should not aim to replace them as a supranational body). 
204 For prominent literature on global legalism and related topics, see 
HENKIN, supra note 55 for a discussion of how international law and global 
legalism affect the behavior of nations.  See also ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF 
GLOBAL LEGALISM 71–79 (2009) (positing that global legalism is a faith—a belief 
that states follow international law as a matter of practice—but not in theory); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2623 (1997) (describing the view of “international law as a set of rules 
promulgated by a pluralistic community of states”); David Zaring, International 
Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 503 (2010) (suggesting that 
cohesiveness between international institutions can broaden the scope with which 
to view problems, thus making international governance more effective). 
205 See HIGGINS, supra note 3 (making the case for legal integration of 
international judicial bodies but not addressing mediation or other non-judicial 
dispute resolution methods, and arguing against global legal pluralism due to the 
practical lack of capacity to achieve it and its effect on discouraging diverse legal 
practices). 
206 See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 204, at 502–04 (stating that international 
institutions such as the WTO might—through the procedural tool of 
interlinkage—foster greater confidence in the effectiveness of the international 
system). 
207 E.g., Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155–
56 (2007) (introducing the idea that countries should embrace multiple ways of 
resolving conflict because of the insights the various actors can provide). 
208 DSD is a framework for the selection of dispute resolution methods that 
fosters systematic dispute resolution practices in the context of a larger conflict 
organization or system.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Roots and Inspirations: A Brief 
History of the Foundations of Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 13, 23 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (explaining 
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assessment of the situation and an evaluation of the effectiveness 
of proposed methods lead to better outcomes.209  The use of DSD 
approaches has been considered in the context of resolving 
international investment disputes,210 and dispute resolution by the 
United Nations211 and shows that they can increase effectiveness, 
efficiency and legitimacy.212  These examples suggest a sensible 
rationale for considering an integrated approach for the 
architecture of the IDR system. 
5.2. Paradigm Shift 
Shifts in the practice and discipline of conflict resolution 
suggest that there is a trend toward integrated approaches.  After 
World War II and during the Cold War, efforts to address conflict 
followed a management approach where states tried to stabilize 
 
DSD as a new field which aids parties to create tailored dispute processes, 
especially for complex of repetitive disputes). 
209 See CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 96–116 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of 
organizational assessment in designing effective conflict management systems); 
WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE 
COSTS OF CONFLICT 41–64 (1988) (exploring how to efficiently design dispute 
resolution systems); see also Chris Carlson, Convening, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING 
HANDBOOK 169–97 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (detailing the steps 
entailed in a successful convening process); SCHEINMAN INST. ON CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION, DESIGNING INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: GUIDELINES 
FOR PRACTITIONERS AND DECISIONMAKERS IN ORGANIZATIONS (2001) (exploring the 
evolution of dispute resolution and the increased emphasis on creating integrated 
conflict management systems); Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, 
Conducting a Conflict Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 99, 99–
136 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (describing the role conflict assessment 
plays in DSD). 
210 See Franck, supra note 54, at 180–81 (arguing that there is a need for the 
systematic treatment of dispute resolution methods that extends beyond the 
existing literature on the ad hoc use of nonbinding IDR methods (mediation and 
conciliation) and considering how it might beneficially inform the field of 
international investment dispute resolution). 
211 See Kenneth Cloke, Conflict Resolution Systems Design, the United Nations 
and the New World Order, 8 MEDIATION Q. 343, 344–45 (1991) (suggesting the 
beneficial application of DSD in United Nations’ dispute resolution). 
212 See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Public and Private International Dispute 
Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 438, 450–51 (Michael L. 
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (discussing cross-fertilization between the 
international and domestic dispute resolution disciplines); see also Amy J. Cohen, 
Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 51, 75–76 (2009) (arguing that there is a need to analyze dispute resolution 
processes alongside legal frameworks in order to understand how one influences 
the other). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SPAIN.DOC 11/23/2010  3:49 PM 
48 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
conflicts in order to mitigate loss of life while still pursuing their 
geopolitical aims.213  Peace was defined as the absence of violence.  
Between 1990 and 2007, 48% of all conflicts occurred in states 
where a conflict had ended no more than five years prior,214 and 
since 2000, there have been a high number of recurrent conflicts.215  
In response to the increase in recurrence, a new paradigm for 
understanding how to end conflict has emerged.216  IDR methods 
have shifted from state-centric, power-based approaches aimed at 
managing conflict, toward interest-based approaches that promote 
resolution between non-state actors through reconciliation and 
other means.217  Efforts to achieve security occur through a mix of 
conflict resolution practices that build a positive peace.218  The 
dominance of state-driven IDR has given way to the rise of inter-
governmental and regional organizations in the last twenty years.  
Regional and local groups have the ability to act as first-responders 
and often add value due to their cultural intelligence of local 
 
213 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 1–8 (discussing the approaches 
to conflict resolution that evolved after World War II).  
214 E.g., Lawrence Woocher, Preventing Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress, 
Meeting Challenges, 231 U.S. INST. OF PEACE SPECIAL REP. 5–6 n.21 (2009) (presenting 
the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset); see also Harbom et al., supra note 63, at 
622 (noting that between 1989–2005, 144 peace agreements were made in 46 of the 
121 armed conflicts: 43 were full agreements, 79 were partial agreements, and 22 
were agreements to start a peace process). 
215 Hewitt, supra note 62, at 27–33 (defining the term ‘conflict’, in the context 
of the data tracked, to include inter, intra and non-state conflict resulting in a 
minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths, which may reflect lower recurrence rates 
for lower-level conflicts and does not reflect levels of new low-level conflict; and 
identifying 31 recurrent conflicts in Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan, India, Chad, Iran and 
two in Myanmar). 
216 The disorganization of existing IDR efforts has been criticized as reducing 
the effectiveness of the international community’s peace-building capacity.  See 
Charles T. Call & Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace: 
International Responses to War-Torn Societies, 9 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 1, 10–15 (2008) 
(examining shortcomings in current IDR, how these shortcomings affect peace-
building efforts, and what is needed to help overcome these shortcomings). 
217 E.g., BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 8–16 (arguing that new 
methods of conflict resolution are more effective and comprehensive because they 
seek to resolve underlying conflicts, rather than solely end violence). 
218 See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (Paul C. Stern & Daniel Druckman, eds., 2000) 
(containing articles covering a wide range of topics related to new methods in 
IDR).  
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contexts.219  The participation of inter-governmental and regional 
organizations has also promoted democratization of IDR and the 
inclusion of civil society participation and non-state governance.  
The United Nations, for instance, has provided non-state entities 
increased access to international lawmaking.220 
This paradigm shift has developed a vision of IDR that 
promotes non-state actor participation, considers a broad scope of 
issues, integrates methods and institutions and enhances its 
capacity to resolve conflict in a variety of international contexts.221  
An integrated system “embod[ies] the authentic meaning of justice:  
to attain peace through effective dispute resolution.”222  However, 
as Part 6 will explore, these changes pose important implications 
for the international legal system. 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Article has identified ways in which international law has 
influenced IDR.  IDR has also developed, as a substructure of 
international law, in ways that affect the superstructure of the 
international legal system.223  As this Article suggests, reforming 
IDR challenges international law to become a more open and 
integrated system.  Embracing mediation and reducing the 
primacy of adjudication removes some authority from states as it 
promotes non-state actor participation in IDR processes.  An 
integrated IDR structure creates a decentralized substructure 
within the international legal system.  This Part considers such 
implications by evaluating how the international legal system’s 
state-centric foundations and scope are in tension with the 
evolving nature of international conflict and approaches to 
resolving it. 
 
219 See Frazier & Dixon, supra note 16, at 390 (outlining two factors that 
contribute to the increased participation of regional organizations in dispute 
resolution). 
220 See ALVAREZ, supra note 188, at 154–56 (discussing the ways in which the 
U.N. has provided increased access to non-state entities). 
221 See Anne Peters, Dual Democracy, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 263, 296–313, 333 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 2009) (discussing 
these principles in the context of a global participatory democracy); see also 
RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW 181–85 (2010) (making the case for the 
need to democratize decision-making in global law). 
222 DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 112. 
223 See CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 18 (exploring the effects of the 
superstructure of international law on its foundation). 
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6.1. Foundations 
The foundations of the international legal system emerged 
from a 17th century conceptual framework of an international 
network of sovereign states that governed their subjects.224  
International law was constructed around the principles of state 
territorial sovereignty and state consent225 and has primarily 
served to regulate the mutual behavior of states.226  With the rise of 
the territorial state, international law developed under a classic 
regime of sovereignty in which the state held authority over all 
other subjects and objects in a given territory.  Non-state actors 
were the objects of a state, based on territorial or other forms of 
control.227  These actors had no standing under international law to 
contest the actions of states; they had to—and often did—resort to 
violence to establish “effective control” over the area or territory if 
they wanted to make a case for international recognition.228 
While the focus on states in the realm of dispute resolution 
once made sense, given the rationale that resolving inter-state 
 
224 See, e.g., David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: 
Sovereignty Transformed?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 162, 162–64 (David Held & Anthony 
McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003) (describing the “classic regime of sovereignty” that 
arose in the seventeenth century). 
225 See generally James Crawford & Susan Marks, The Global Democracy Deficit: 
An Essay in International Law and its Limits, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN 
SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 5, at 137–38 (noting that territorial sovereignty 
and state consent had become defining pillars of international law by the early 
nineteenth century). 
226 See, e.g., DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 57–58 (emphasizing that international 
law primarily governs state actors rather than individuals because states have 
“plenary legal capacity”). 
227 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–67 
(7th ed. 2008) (explaining that because corporations do not have international 
legal personality, an agreement between a state and a foreign corporation is not 
necessarily subject to the law of treaties; however, states may agree to grant 
certain entities like corporations legal status so that they can be governed by that 
state’s national law).  
228 E.g., David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty 
Transformed?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE, supra note 224, at 162–63 (explaining that some actors 
attempted to assert territorial control through violence in order to obtain 
sovereign recognition within the global political community); see also Thomas 
Baldwin, The Territorial State, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 207, 224–25 
(Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992) (explaining that because the current 
international legal system does not provide opportunities for communities to 
“secede from existing political arrangements[,]” communities rely upon violence 
to assert control over territories).  
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disputes would prevent nations from employing their armies and 
thus aid in the reduction of war, this paradigm no longer holds 
true.  In its 1949 Reparations Opinion, the ICJ treated the U.N. as an 
international person with the capacity to bring international 
claims.229  This marked an early expansion of subjecthood beyond 
states to international organizations.230  Such expansion must go 
further because threats to global peace and security are 
increasingly taking place within, not between, states.  If state 
dominance in IDR prevails, it will restrict the capacity of the 
system.231  Opening up the IDR system is necessary to advance its 
capacity for dispute resolution.  Effective dispute resolution 
requires the participation of key stakeholders, regardless of legal 
status under international law.  It also requires appreciating and 
addressing the interplay between legal and extra-legal aspects of a 
dispute.  However, the opening of the system needs to occur in a 
way that will integrate, not divide, the distinct parts of the 
system.232 
Despite the evolution of IDR, the foundations of international 
law remain state-centric.233  This is evident in the ways that the IDR 
system promotes the supremacy of the state and limits non-state 
actor participation.  Adjudication is designed around rules created 
by states and participation controlled by states.  Non-judicial forms 
of IDR that are open to more parties have been underdeveloped.  If 
resolving disputes remains the business of states and the system 
itself remains closed, the tension between an evolving IDR system 
 
229 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178, 187 (Apr. 11) (holding that there can be 
types of international legal personality beyond statehood). 
230 See CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 20–21 (noting that in the wake of the ICJ’s 
1949 Reparations Opinion, several non-state international organizations have since 
been recognized as actors who may participate in international dispute 
resolution).  
231 See DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 110–11 (arguing that the structure of the 
modern state and the state’s dominant role in international affairs constrains 
resolution of legal disputes in a global context). 
232 See, e.g., ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 26–28 (2009) (discussing how international law has diverged 
into public and private realms, with the latter affording non-state actors more 
access and authority). 
233 See generally STEPHEN BELL & ANDREW HINDMOOR, RETHINKING 
GOVERNANCE: THE CENTRALITY OF THE STATE IN MODERN SOCIETY (2009) (discussing 
the origins and purpose of state-centricity in governance within international 
law). 
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(the superstructure) and the state-centric foundations of 
international law will continue to grow. 
6.2. Scope 
There is also fundamental tension about scope or who 
international law ought to serve.234  This tension manifests itself 
when the priorities of the state clash with those of the public. 235  It 
is also evident in instances where international law limits powerful 
states in the protection of collective interests.236  One important 
shift in scope has been the conceptualization of an international 
community that goes beyond an identity based solely on the 
collection of states, to include a broader collection of stakeholders 
joined by shared interests.  This concept of collectivity and its place 
in international law is not new.  Crawford described it as having a 
“responsibility to the international community as a whole.”237  
 
234 See Teruo Komori, Introduction to PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 1, 1 (Teruo Komori & Karel Wellens 
eds., 2009) (discussing how general international rules were not created to protect 
the general interests of a global human community and why this is changing with 
regard to international environmental protection, humanitarian law, law of the 
sea and space, and other areas of international law).  
235 See generally Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (explaining how 
international law can be used as a forum to form mutual agreements among self-
interested actors). 
236 See Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An ‘Empire of Law’ or 
the ‘Law of Empire’?, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 811, 836 (2009) (describing the shift in 
international law from a system based on the co-existence of nations to one based 
on a new “empire,” defined as a collective order that exists beyond statehood); 
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, The Role of International Forums in the Advancement 
of Sustainable Development, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4 (2009) (discussing 
how international forums can advance sustainable development and counter the 
problems posed by competing national and international interests).  But see 
PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF 
GLOBAL RULES (2005) (analyzing recent events in international law and discussing 
some of the circumstances in which certain states rebel against international 
agreements often for domestic collective interests that conflict with the 
international rules); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some Reflections on Contemporary 
International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A Response to Martti 
Koskenniemi, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 131 (2005) (noting that national interests often 
trump longer term international objectives because powerful nations maneuver 
against majority aims, as demonstrated by the tensions between U.S. unilateralism 
and EU multilateralism, particularly pertaining to matters of terrorism during the 
past decade). 
237 JAMES CRAWFORD, Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 5, at 341.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/1
SPAIN.DOC 11/23/2010  3:49 PM 
2010] RETHINKING INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 53 
Supported by a guiding principle of solidarity, the concept has 
origins in Christian and natural law.238  From universal norms to 
shared obligations, this idea recognizes that for certain matters, 
and in certain instances, international law ought to prioritize 
collective rights, interests, and needs.239  The establishment of the 
International Criminal Court and efforts to protect global 
environmental resources offer two powerful examples of areas 
where collectivity is a guiding principle.  IDR offers a third. 
Like most international rules and institutions, the IDR system 
was built by states through international agreements.  To protect 
their authority, nations are reluctant to create and enter into 
regimes that require them to submit to higher forms of authority 
against their consent.  As a result, state participation in IDR is 
subject to some form of consent, whether explicit or implied.  This 
is true for both mediation, which is voluntary (although sometimes 
coerced) and adjudication, which requires state consent through 
express agreement or implied means.  Thus, state participation in 
an IDR process necessarily requires some willingness on the state’s 
part to defer to an outside authority and to be confined by such.  
This requirement makes states cautious about pursuing 
adjudication to address their most serious conflicts.240  Legitimacy 
and representation problems at the ICJ and the PCA further 
contribute to this tendency.241 
It is difficult for the IDR system to protect collective interests 
when they are not aligned with or are contrary to those of states.  
Furthermore, it is unclear if states can or should define what the 
interests of the public are.  A system that requires state consent 
does not allow for the protection of a collective public stakeholder 
because the interests of disagreeing states will prevail.  This is at 
tension with the core purpose of having an IDR system that 
 
238 For a historical and definitional background on the concept of solidarity in 
international law, see Rudiger Wolfrum, Solidarity Amongst States: An Emerging 
Structural Principle of International Law, 49 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 8 (2009). 
239 See generally DELMAS-MARTY, supra note 47 (arguing for a more integrated 
system of international law that would provide order to the rights and interests 
involved without excluding them). 
240 See id. at 34–35 (describing a nation as regressive when it closes itself off 
from international community).  
241 See G. Shinkaretskaya, supra note 69, at 89 (explaining that because “the 
decisions of international adjudication bodies can have no other significance than 
that provided by Statute documents,” the international adjudicatory bodies exist 
in an odd framework vis-à-vis the state and concerned parties). 
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protects the common interests of all nations by replacing the 
“recourse to self-help by individual states by a collective response 
system.”242  Translating this founding philosophy into other areas 
of collective concern, such as global peace and security, presents 
significant challenges and raises important questions about how to 
prioritize conflicts of interest between states and the collective 
global community. 
The state-centric model frustrates the ability to include the 
broader international public or non-state stakeholders in a conflict 
resolution or problem-solving process in a way that does not 
demand their inferior status.  States are the primary subjects of 
international law based on their superior legal status.243  Yet, full 
participation is paramount to the success of IDR and sustaining 
agreements that maintain peaceful conditions over the long term.244  
Society-centered approaches that involve the international 
community as a whole in promoting the collective interests of 
global peace and security are established through largely 
egalitarian governance networks.245  For IDR, this necessarily 
requires embracing a paradigm shift away from the state-centric 
model, and, perhaps, accepting a system that treats the individual 
as the ultimate subject of authority in international law.246  
However, translating these preferences from IDR to international 
law as a whole requires a balanced approach, since both state and 
collective interests are valued in the international order. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Global changes are prompting reforms in international law 
and, as this Article has shown, in our approaches to resolving 
 
242 Wolfrum, supra note 238, at 13. 
243 See DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 58 (arguing that states are the primary 
subjects of international law, and that individuals are subordinate to states within 
this framework). 
244 See id. at 181–85 (arguing that global law should be grounded upon a 
horizontal democratic structure that fosters broad participation amongst diverse 
types of actors, rather than domination by a select cohort of powerful state actors). 
245 See generally BELL & HINDMOOR, supra note 233, at 3 (stating that society-
centered approaches involve “a wider range of actors within governing processes 
. . . held together . . . by informal and relatively egalitarian networks”). 
246 See generally Samantha Besson, The Authority of International Law—Lifting 
the State Veil, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 343 (2009) (arguing that international law should 
understand individuals, not states, as the central actors and as the basis of the 
law’s authority and legitimacy). 
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international disputes.  The data on international conflict suggests 
that intra-state wars are the primary emerging threat to global 
peace and security.  Ethnic wars, identity conflict, terrorism, and 
non-state wars extend beyond the traditional inter-state paradigm.  
As these types of conflict emerge, they call into question whether 
the international legal system, largely created by states for states, 
has the capacity to address international conflict in the modern era. 
This Article has argued that there are three fundamental 
limitations of the IDR system.  As long as the IDR system operates 
in a silo manner that focuses primarily on adjudication, it will be 
limited in its capacity and effectiveness.  International adjudication 
forums need to find new ways to open their doors to non-state 
stakeholders.  Mediation at the international level requires 
additional institutionalization and support.  International legal 
scholars need to enhance understanding about the use of multiple 
methods and mixed methods, and when and why they provide 
valuable contributions to the IDR system.  Finally, the architecture 
of the IDR system would benefit from a framework that promotes 
the integration of methods and institutions in order to increase 
capacity and effectiveness. 
The proliferation and evolution of IDR demands rethinking its 
traditional structure and recognizing where it is dependent on and 
independent from international law.  Conceptualizing IDR as an 
integrated system requires increasing the participation of non-state 
actors and considering how extra-legal issues should be resolved 
alongside legal ones.  It also recognizes the complexity of IDR as a 
substructure of the international legal system that branches into 
political, social, and cultural realms.  In these ways, IDR has the 
potential to influence the foundations of international law in small, 
but profound, ways. 
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